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                          The Wall and the Law: 
                              A Tale of Two Judgements 
 
                    Susan Akram* and Michael Lynk**
  
  
 (Published in (2006), 24 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 61)   
  
       
I Introduction 
 
Before I built a wall I’d ask to know 
    What I was walling in or walling out 
    And to whom I was like to give offence 
 
     Robert Frost, Mending Wall 
 
 
In late June and early July of 2004, two courts in different parts of the world issued a pair 
of remarkable judgements examining the legality of the separation wall that Israel is 
building through the West Bank and East Jerusalem.1 While both judgements were 
critical of the Wall, their judicial approaches and legal conclusions were strikingly 
divergent, particularly given that the two courts were purporting to rely upon the same 
principles of international law. Indeed, even their vocabulary differed: one court used the 
term “wall”, while the other called it a “fence”.2
 
 The judgements also elicited quite 
different political and diplomatic reactions, especially among the parties most involved in 
the Israel/Palestine conflict. Moreover, the subsequent impact of the judgements has been 
profoundly contradictory. On the one hand, the two rulings have made the clearest case 
yet for the indispensable role of the rule of law in mediating a just and lasting settlement 
of the conflict. Yet, more than a year after the judgements, the Wall continues to be built, 
and Israel has paid only a trifling price for its legal and political obstructionism.   
                                                
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University Law School. 
** Assistant Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, the University of Western Ontario. 
1 For an insightful discussion of the Wall and its impact upon Palestinian society in the West Bank, as well 
as its contribution to the dwindling prospects for a two-state solution, see P. Lagerquist, “Facing the Last 
Sky: Excavating Palestine after Israel’s ‘Separation Wall’ ” (2004), 33 Journal of Palestine Studies 5.  
2 This article will adopt the terminology of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, and 
refer to the  physical barrier as the “Wall”. 
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On 9 July 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its widely-anticipated 
advisory opinion on the Wall’s legality, in response to a question referred to it by the 
United Nations General Assembly the previous December.3 In Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,4
 
 the 
International Court found, by a 14-1 margin, that the construction of the Wall in occupied 
territory violated international law, and held that Israel was required to dismantle it 
immediately and pay reparations to all those who have suffered damages. The political 
reaction was immediate. Coverage of the ICJ opinion was headline news around the 
world; Israel, the Bush administration, and the United States House of Representatives all 
sharply denounced the decision; the United Nations General Assembly voted 
overwhelmingly two weeks later to accept the Court’s ruling; and the Israeli debate over 
the judgement became an incendiary political issue for the remainder of the summer. The 
Advisory Opinion marked the very first occasion where issues central to the 
Israel/Palestine conflict have been addressed by a prominent international judicial body. 
The forcefulness and clarity of the ICJ judgement has challenged the largely successful 
efforts to date by Israel and the United States to exclude international humanitarian and 
human rights principles from efforts to resolve the conflict.  
Nine days earlier, on 30 June, the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of 
Justice, delivered its altogether more modest ruling in Beit Sourik Village Council v. 
Israel.5
                                                
3 U.N.G.A. Res. ES-10/14 (8 December 2003). The formal question asked by the General Assembly was: 
 The case had been initiated by Palestinian residents of villages to the northwest 
of Jerusalem, who sought to quash Israeli military orders to construct portions of the Wall 
through their lands. In its judgement, the Supreme Court rejected the villagers’ arguments 
that the Wall violated international law, but it went on to rule that the actual route of this 
portion of the Wall near Jerusalem failed a proportionality test that balances the security 
What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the 
Occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, 
as described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of 
international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and the relevant Security 
Council and General Assembly resolutions? 
4 (2004), 43 ILM 1009. [Hereinafter Advisory Opinion]. The ICJ Opinion, formally called the dispositif, 
can be viewed at: http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwp/imwpframe.htm 
5 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel and the Commander of the IDF Forces in the 
West Bank (2004), 43 ILM 1099. [Hereinafter Beit Sourik]. 
needs of the military and the humanitarian concerns of the occupied population. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court ordered approximately 25 kilometres of the 40 kilometre 
stretch challenged by the villagers to be re-routed closer to the 1967 Green Line. Israeli 
political and military leaders at first expressed a mixture of dismay and guarded relief 
over the Supreme Court ruling. However, once the Advisory Opinion was released a week 
and a half later, they enthusiastically embraced the Beit Sourik judgement, stating that it 
would be the only judicial ruling they would respect and implement. Since the Supreme 
Court ruling, Israel has made some changes in the Wall’s planned path in direct response 
to the decision, while continuing to build the barrier predominately on occupied lands and 
private Palestinian property. 
 
Both decisions have received extensive legal and academic scrutiny since their release, 
particularly the Advisory Opinion.6
                                                
6 The American Journal of International Law, the principal scholarly publication of the American Society 
of International Law and probably the most prestigious international law journal in the world, devoted a 
large portion of a recent issue to the Advisory Opinion, with nine substantive articles defending or 
critiquing the ruling: (2005), 99 American Journal of International Law 1-141.  
 This is welcomed, as the broad legal and diplomatic 
consensus that Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory is manifestly illegal serves as 
an ongoing, if modest, constraint on its colonizing activities. However, the divergent 
approaches to international law employed in the two rulings, and their quite distinct legal 
conclusions, say as much about the two courts themselves as they do about the laws of 
occupation. One ruling, coming from the highest judicial organ of the United Nations, 
provides a dispassionate, yet erudite, application of the primary rules of international law. 
It offers guidelines for ending the conflict, and is a direct reminder to the international 
community of its obligations to bring to an end the illegal situation arising from the 
occupation. The other ruling, from the occupier’s highest court, shares certain basic 
assumptions with the Israeli government and military on the critical features of the 
conflict, breaking rank only on tertiary issues about how to balance the acute 
humanitarian distress among the Palestinian population. Indeed, if law is politics by other 
means, then we can read into the rulings the two diametrically opposite approaches to the 
conflict: one reflecting the formal international consensus of the profound illegality of the 
Wall; and the other reflecting the strategy of legal exceptionalism that Israel has so 
effectively employed over the decades to entrench its military conquest and its 
demographic gains. 
 
II  The ICJ Advisory Opinion 
 
The Court considers that the construction of the wall and its associated regime 
create a “fait accompli” on the ground that could well become permanent, in 
which case, and notwithstanding the formal characterization of the wall by Israel, 
it would be tantamount to de facto annexation. 
   
     Wall  Advisory Opinion, at para. 121. 
 
 
It is difficult to conceive, in a conflict as lengthy and complex as that of Palestine-Israel, 
that none of the significant underlying legal issues had reached the ICJ prior to the 
General Assembly’s Advisory Request on Israel’s Wall construction in 2004. Early 
attempts to challenge the legality of the General Assembly resolution recommending 
partition of historic Palestine through appeal to the ICJ were thwarted by political 
pressure exerted by the major powers.7  Unlike the situation of South Africa’s occupation 
of Namibia and its apartheid policies, which generated four advisory opinions from the 
ICJ to the General Assembly,8 the political bodies of the United Nations made no attempt 
after 1948 to obtain an opinion from the ICJ respecting the issues underlying the conflict 
until the December 2003 request.9
 
  
After receiving the request for an advisory opinion on the Wall from the General 
Assembly, the ICJ provided the United Nations, its member states, and several interested 
                                                
7 For texts of the requests by Egypt, Iraq and Syria to obtain an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the 
legality of the partition resolution, and the discussion in the General Assembly, see U.N. docs. A/AC.14/21; 
A/AC.14/25; A/AC.14/14, reprinted in 1949 U.N.Y.B. 1947-48, U.N. Sales No. 1949.I.13. 
8 See: Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, [1971] ICJ Rep. 16 
(Jun. 21); Voting Procedure on Questions relating to Reports and Petitions concerning the Territory of 
South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, [1955] ICJ Rep. 67; Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the 
Committee on South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, [1956] ICJ. Rep. 23 (Jun. 1); International Status of 
South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, [1950] ICJ. Rep. 128 (Jul. 11). In addition, the ICJ also heard a 
contentious case on the issues relating to S. Africa’s occupation and apartheid, see South West Africa 
(Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), [1966] ICJ. Rep. 6 (Jul. 18).   
9 In his concurring opinion issued in the Advisory Opinion, Judge Elaraby remarked on the singular absence 
of resort to the ICJ to clarify the highly contentious legal issues in the Palestine-Israel conflict, despite the 
special responsibility of the UN towards resolution of the problem: Elaraby Opinion, at para. 1.  
inter-governmental organizations the opportunity to submit written statements and to 
participate in the oral proceedings held on February 23, 2004.10 Forty-three states, as well 
as Palestine, the United Nations, the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, and the European Union, submitted written or oral statements, or both.11 The 
content of Israel’s submission of over one hundred pages comprised objections to the 
Court’s jurisdiction; Israel otherwise declined to address the substantive issues raised in 
the General Assembly’s request.12
 
 The United States also filed a submission contesting 
the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the matter, but did not address the merits. 
Nevertheless, through the plethora of submissions, and Israel’s statements in the case to 
the UN and readily available elsewhere, the Court received a substantive briefing of both 
the legal issues and the factual situation relevant to the request.  
The Court’s ruling, set out in 163 paragraphs, touched on many of the primary legal 
issues relevant to the Israel-Palestine conflict and the Israeli occupation – some in 
significant detail, and others with more superficial analysis that has raised questions 
about the soundness of the Court’s conclusions on several points. The fifteen sitting 
justices voted 14-1 on all but two issues. On the issue of whether the ICJ had jurisdiction 
over the issue of the Wall, the judges ruled unanimously that it did. On the issue of 
whether there was an obligation on all states to take certain action concerning the Wall, 
the Court held that they did, by a 13-2 vote. Seven judges wrote separate opinions, 
including those who voted with the majority but elaborated their concerns about different 
aspects of the Court’s conclusions.13
 
  
In the Advisory Opinion, the International Court dealt with seven significant legal issues. 
Its conclusions on these issues were supported by a substantial majority of the sitting 
                                                
10 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Order of 19 
Dec. 2003, Gen. List No. 131 (2003), http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm. 
11 See Written Statements, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm. 
12 See Arthur Max, World Court Hears Case on Israeli Barrier, Associated Press, 23 February 2004, 
available at: http://www.twincities.com/mld/twincities/8019092.html.   
13 See Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma, 43 ILM at 1056; Separate Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh, 43 
ILM at 1075; Separate Opinion of Judge Elaraby, 43 ILM at 1081; Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, 43 
ILM at 1091; Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, 43 ILM at 1058; Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, 
43 ILM at 1065; and Declaration of Judge Buergenthal, 43 ILM at 1078.  
justices, with the American justice, Thomas Buergenthal, the sole dissenter on five of the 
conclusions.14 The ICJ concluded that it had jurisdiction to render the advisory opinion as 
requested by the General Assembly;15 that there were no compelling political or 
diplomatic reasons for it to not render the opinion;16 that the Wall as currently 
constructed within the occupied territories and East Jerusalem violates international 
law;17 and that Israel must immediately stop construction, dismantle the Wall, terminate 
its breaches of international law in maintaining the Wall regime, and nullify all related 
legislation, actions and policies.18 The Court stated that Israel must restore all Palestinian 
properties confiscated in construction of the wall and pay reparations for all damage 
caused by such construction;19 that the community of states has an obligation to ensure 
compliance with the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, not to recognize Israel’s actions 
in constructing the Wall and establishing the Wall regime, and to cease all aid to Israel 
that supports its acts;20and, finally, that the United Nations, particularly the General 
Assembly and the Security Council, must take further action to terminate the illegal 





The ICJ’s jurisdiction to address the case was strongly resisted by Israel, and also by a 
number of other states, primarily within the EU. The jurisdictional arguments were 
complicated, but the main challenges were to the competence of the Court to hear the 
request, the competence of the General Assembly to seek an advisory opinion in the 
manner that it did, whether the request concerned a ‘legal matter’ which the Court was 
competent to address, and whether the Court, in any event, should decline the request for 
prudential reasons. By a unanimous vote, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to render 
                                                
14 Advisory Opinion, at para. 163. 
15 Id. at para. 163(1). 
16 Id. at para. 163(2). 
17 Id. at para. 163(3)(A). 
18 Id. at para. 163(3)(B). 
19 Id. at para. 163(3)(C). 
20 Id. at para.163(3)(D). 
21 Id. at para. 163(3)(E). 
the advisory opinion requested, and, with only Judge Buergenthal dissenting, that it 
should exercise its discretion to render its opinion.  
 
In response to the various jurisdictional arguments that were raised, the Court made 
several significant points relevant to the fundamental issues of the Middle East conflict 
and to strategic considerations for the General Assembly’s role in the conflict. First, the 
ICJ reaffirmed that Article 96 of the UN Charter and Article 65 of the ICJ Statute give it 
the authority to render an advisory opinion on any matter referred to it by a recognized 
organ of the United Nations.22  The Court emphasized that, as the formal judicial organ 
of the United Nations, it was required to give advisory opinions to any UN body in the 
exercise of its mandated functions under its statute, and that it has never in its history 
declined to render an advisory opinion to an authorized UN body. Further, the 
International Court found no impropriety in the General Assembly’s decision to bring the 
issue to it through an ongoing process under the Uniting for Peace Resolution.23 The 
Court’s conclusions on the procedural background to the General Assembly’s request 
affirmed the competence of the GA to take a deadlocked issue away from the Security 
Council, to pass resolutions concerning it, and to go directly to the ICJ for an advisory 
ruling.24 In addition, it dismissed arguments that the issues were too political, should be 
left to the parties to decide, prejudiced one side, or otherwise conflicted with the 
negotiation process.25 Finally, in a critical move, the Court recognized the standing of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization to appear before the ICJ.26
 
 
                                                
22 See U.N. CHARTER art. 96, at para. 1 (“The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the 
International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question”). See also Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, annexed to U.N. CHARTER, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, art. 
65, para. 1 (“The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body 
may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request.”). 
23 The Court observed that the Tenth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly was convened 
numerous times under Resolution 377 (V)—the ‘Uniting for Peace’ Resolution—in response to the 
repeated negative votes of the US in the Security Council which prevented decisive action in the Palestine-
Israel conflict in situations clearly threatening international peace and security. Resolution 377 (V) 
provides that if the Security Council fails to act because one or more Permanent Member fails to agree in 
situations of “a threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression…” the General Assembly shall 
consider the matter in emergency special session. G.A. Res. 377 (V), 302d plenary mtg., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/377(V)(1950).  
24 Advisory Opinion, at paras. 28-35. 
25 Id. at paras. 41, 49, 53. 
26 Id. at paras. 4-5.  
The authority of the International Court of Justice to exercise jurisdiction, and the 
propriety of its doing so, received overwhelming support amongst the judges. Only four 
of the justices expressed misgivings about how the jurisdiction question was analyzed.27 
However, several legal commentators have criticized the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction 
on two main points: whether the General Assembly actually had the authority to seek an 
advisory opinion on the question in the first place; and whether the Court should have 
exercised its discretion to render the opinion based on the record before it.28
 
  
The question of whether the General Assembly had the authority to refer the issue to the 
ICJ in the first place was, in essence, about the reach of Article 12(1) of the UN Charter, 
and the effect on that provision of the Uniting For Peace Resolution 377 (V).29  To 
address the question, the Court reviewed the procedural history that brought the Advisory 
Question to it, and examined how Res. 377(V) had changed the practice and relationship 
between the two bodies, the Security Council and General Assembly. The ICJ concluded 
that the Security Council and General Assembly were now in agreement that the meaning 
of the language in Art. 12(1) that prohibited the General Assembly from acting on an 
issue if the Security Council “is exercising (its) functions” concerning that issue clearly 
meant that the Security Council had to be acting on the issue “at that moment”.30
                                                
27 See Separate Opinions of Justices Higgins, Kooijmans, Owada and Buergenthal. 
  As 
long as the Security Council was not debating the very issue at the same time as the 
General Assembly was considering it, then the Uniting for Peace Resolution gave the 
General Assembly full authority to address it. This critical finding has broad-ranging 
ramifications for the division of responsibility between the Security Council and General 
Assembly in terms of addressing threats to peace and security worldwide. It is 
particularly welcomed authority for the General Assembly to exercise greater power in 
the Palestine-Israel conflict when faced with the Security Council’s perpetual deadlock 
28 See, e.g., Michla Pomerance, The ICJ’s Advisory Jurisdiction and the Crumbling Wall Between the 
Political and the Judicial, (2005), 99 AJIL 26; see also, Ruth Wedgwood, The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the 
Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of Self-Defense, (2005), 99 AJIL 52.  
29 Art. 12(1) of the UN Charter states: “While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or 
situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any 
recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.” 
30 Remarks of the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, 23d GA, 3d Comm, 1637th mtg, A/C.3/SR.1637, 
para. 9, cited in Advisory Opinion, at paras. 27, 28. 
from taking appropriate action to restore the rule of law – due, of course, to repeated 
vetoes of any criticism of Israel in the Council.  
  
The second jurisdictional question – whether or not the Court should exercise its 
authority to render an opinion as a matter of discretion – has several significant features. 
These features include whether there was a sufficient factual record before the Court to 
properly respond to the Advisory Request, and whether Israel’s objection to jurisdiction 
should bind the Court. Israel’s position on this question was contradictory. In its 
submission, it exhaustively detailed the threats posed to it by Palestinian ‘terrorism,’ 
challenged the Court’s jurisdiction to address the Advisory Question, but then refused to 
provide the Court with its arguments on the merits, and made no oral presentation.31
 
 
Israel further argued that, since it refused to recognize the Court’s jurisdiction in this 
case, the Court must decline jurisdiction to render an opinion.  
Judge Buergenthal’s opinion – couched as a Declaration rather than a dissenting opinion 
– focused primarily on the issue of insufficiency of factual evidence, and was his stated 
motivation both for finding that the Court should not have exercised jurisdiction, and for 
dissenting on the merits.32 A careful reading of Judge Buergenthal’s opinion, however, 
reflects that his real concern was whether Israel’s legal arguments of self-defence and 
necessity had been fully made on the record, and considered by the Court.33
                                                
31 While Israel subsequently criticized the Advisory Opinion as lacking a sufficient factual record on the 
issue of terrorism and justified self-defence, it expended 42 pages of its written submission to detailing 
Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israel. Moreover, the Secretary-General included a summary of Israel’s 
legal arguments made to the UN in his dossier to the ICJ. See UN Doc. A/ES-10/248 (Nov. 24, 2003), 
Annex I, “Summary Legal Position of the Government of Israel.”   
 Whether the 
Court had sufficiently well-developed legal arguments is a different question from 
whether it had such an inadequate factual record that it should have declined to address 
the advisory question.  The ICJ is fully capable of understanding, researching and 
developing each of the relevant legal arguments presented, whether thoroughly analyzed 
32 See Buergenthal Declaration, at para. 1 (stating:  “…I am compelled to vote against the Court’s findings 
on the merits because the Court did not have before it the requisite factual bases for its sweeping findings; 
it should therefore have declined to hear the case.”) 
33 Id., at para. 3 (stating that the Court may be right that all or part of the wall violated international law, but 
“to reach that conclusion with regard to the wall as a whole without having before it or seeking to ascertain 
all relevant facts bearing directly on issues of Israel’s legitimate right of self-defence, military necessity 
and security needs….cannot be justified as a matter of law). 
by any of the various submissions or not, and its advisory function requires that it do so. 
It concluded, from all of the evidence available, that: “…it has before it sufficient 




Citing a 1923 decision of the ICJ’s predecessor, the Permanent Court of Justice (PCIJ), in 
the Eastern Carelia case, Israel claimed that the Court must decline to give an opinion 
since the question involved a dispute between two parties, and because one of the two 
parties – Israel – objected to the Court’s jurisdiction.35 Judge Buergenthal pointed out, 
correctly, that Israel had no obligation to consent to the proceedings, since they were 
advisory only. The Court’s reading of Eastern Carelia concluded that, in that case, the 
dispositive issue was that one party to the dispute, Russia, was neither a member of the 
League of Nations, nor submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCIJ, as required under the 
League’s Covenant. In contrast, Israel is a member of the United Nations, and as such, 
must accede to the authority of the various bodies of the UN to seek advisory opinions. 
Several of the separate opinions stressed the fact that the Palestine-Israel conflict is both a 
bilateral dispute as well as a dispute in which the UN has been intimately engaged for 
decades. As such, the existence of a bilateral dispute cannot, in the words of Judge 
Kooijmans, “deprive the organs of the organized community of the competence which 
has been assigned to them by the constitutive instruments.”36
 
 
The ICJ’s conclusions that it had an adequate factual and legal record to exercise 
jurisdiction – with or without a submission by Israel on the merits – is likely to stand the 
test of time and criticism. The jurisdictional analysis of the opinion is thorough, sound, 
and adequately reflects the weight of the law on key points.37
                                                
34 Advisory Opinion, at para. 58. 
 It would have been far 
35 The Court’s predecessor, the Permanent Court of Justice (“PCIJ”), declined to render an advisory opinion 
to the League of Nations for considerations relating to its mandate towards a non-League-member state and 
to its authorizing statute, issues the Court found were not relevant to the current Court and composition of 
the United Nations. See Status of Eastern Carelia (Fin. v. Russ.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5 (Russia was 
not a member of the League, and neither state conceded to PCIJ jurisdiction.).  
36 Kooijmans Opinion, at para. 27.   
37 See Richard Falk, Toward Authoritativeness: The ICJ Ruling on Israel’s Security Wall, (2005), 99 AJIL 
42, at 45. 
more difficult for the Court to support a decision that it did not have, or should not 
exercise, jurisdiction. As it pointed out: “[it] has never, in the exercise of this 
discretionary power, declined to respond to a request for an advisory opinion.”38
 
   
(ii) Substantive Arguments 
 
Certain aspects of the International Court of Justice’s treatment of the substantive 
arguments, particularly those relating to humanitarian law and the laws of war, are more 
problematic, and are already proving more controversial than its treatment of the 
jurisdictional issues. Before reaching the merits of the case, the Court briefly reviewed 
the relevant historical and legal status of the occupied territories and of Israel’s 
boundaries. It reviewed Palestine’s history as a former Mandate territory under the 
protection of the League of Nations, the critical UN Resolutions affecting the issues at 
hand, and the conflicts of 1948 and 1967. The ICJ concluded that under the 1949 
Armistice Agreements and the corpus of UN Resolutions on the question, the areas 
between “the Green Line and the former eastern boundary of Palestine under the Mandate 
were occupied by Israel in 1967 during the armed conflict between Israel and Jordan.”39 
These areas, as well as East Jerusalem, were, as a legal matter, occupied territories and 
Israel, as the occupying power, was obligated to conform to certain international legal 
requirements. In finding that the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem are “occupied 
territories” and that Israel is an ‘occupying power,’ the Court had to address several 
longstanding Israeli objections to these characterizations, which it discussed at length 
later in the opinion. Preliminarily, it found that Israel was bound to the Hague 
Regulations of 1907 as a matter of customary law, and that Article 42 of those 
Regulations defined the status of these areas as occupied.40
                                                
38 Advisory Opinion, at para. 44. The Court distinguished its refusal to give an advisory opinion to the 
WHO in the Nuclear Weapons case because of the Court’s stated lack of jurisdiction over the question. See 
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ Rep. 226 
(July 8).  
  
39 Advisory Opinion, at para. 78. 
40 “The Court would observe that, under customary international law as reflected…in Article 42 of the 
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention 
of 18 October 1907…territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the 
hostile army, and the occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and 
 
Having found that the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem have the status of occupied 
territories and that Israel’s status as occupying power had significant legal consequences 
relating to the Advisory Request, the International Court turned to what it earlier 
described as the “the wall and its associated regime.”41 It reviewed the extensive 
documentation submitted by the UN and other participants to the proceedings on the 
physical construction of the Wall, the related Israeli policies, the consequences to the 
Palestinians of the Wall’s construction, and the purported motivations for constructing 
the Wall. Concerning the physical construction, the Court accepted the findings of the 
report and Written Statement of the Secretary-General, which were not contradicted by 
Israel, that the Wall was a ‘complex’ consisting of electronically-sensored fences, ditches 
up to 4 metres in depth, two-lane asphalt roads for Israeli patrols, paths running alongside 




Describing the physical works as only part of a larger related system, the Court stated:  
 
Lastly, it should be noted that the construction of the wall has been accompanied by the 
creation of a new administrative regime. Thus in October 2003 the Israeli Defence Forces 
issued Orders establishing the part of the West Bank lying between the Green Line and 
the wall as a ‘Closed Area.’ Residents of this area may no longer remain in it, nor may 
non-residents enter it, unless holding a permit or identity card issued by the Israeli 
authorities. According to the report of the Secretary-General, most residents have 
received permits for a limited period. Israeli citizens, Israeli permanent residents and 
those eligible to immigrate to Israel in accordance with the Law of Return may remain in, 
or move freely to, from and within the Closed Area without a permit. Access to and exit 
from the Closed Area can only be made through access gates, which are opened 
infrequently and for short periods.43
 
 
The Court then turned to the most important substantive legal principles and rules 
applying to the conflict in order to spell out Israel’s obligations with respect to the Wall 
                                                                                                                                              
can be exercised….All these territories (including East Jerusalem) remain occupied territories and Israel 
has continued to have the status of occupying power.” Id.  
41 Id. at paras. 79-85. 
42 Id. at para. 82.   
43 Id. at para. 85.  
regime.44
 
 In doing so, it reviewed Israel’s ongoing objections to the applicability of 
international humanitarian law and human rights conventions in the occupied territories.  
Beginning with the United Nations Charter and customary international law principles, 
the International Court found that acquisition and annexation of territory by force is 
clearly and inherently illegal, and that states are required to refuse to recognize the 
forcible annexation of territory.45 Further, under the UN Charter, numerous UN 
resolutions, and the main human rights conventions, all peoples have the right to self-
determination.46 The Court stated that there was no longer any question that the principle 
of self-determination applies to the Palestinian people; as recognized repeatedly by UN 
Resolutions and the international community: “the existence of the ‘Palestinian people’ is 
no longer at issue.”47
 
  
In response to challenges to its actions towards Palestinians in their territories, Israel has 
consistently taken the position that neither international humanitarian law nor 
international human rights law applies to the occupation.48 Israel’s stated position has 
been that international humanitarian law, primarily the Fourth Geneva Convention of 
1949, does not apply to the occupied territories because Jordan was not a legally 
recognized ‘sovereign’ of the West Bank, as required by Article 2 of that Convention.49
 
 
The International Court definitively rejected this ‘missing reversioner’ argument – an 
argument promoted by some Israeli jurists but overwhelmingly rejected by the weight of 
international legal authority. Putting the argument to rest, the ICJ stated that:  
[It] considers that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable in any occupied territory 
in the event of an armed conflict arising between two or more High Contracting Parties. 
Israel and Jordan were parties to that Convention when the 1967 armed conflict broke 
                                                
44 Id. at para. 86. 
45 Id. at para 88. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at para. 118.  
48 Id. at para. 90.  
49 Article 2, at para. 2 of the  Fourth Geneva Convention (Common Art. 2 of the four Conventions) states, 
in part: “…[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict 
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not 
recognized by one of them…” Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
out. The Court accordingly finds that that Convention is applicable in the Palestinian 
territories which before the conflict lay to the east of the Green Line and which, during 
that conflict, were occupied by Israel, there being no need for any enquiry into the precise 
prior status of those territories.50
 
  
As well, the Court found that Israel was bound to the provisions of the 1907 Hague 
Regulations, particularly Section III concerning military authority over hostile territory, 




After concluding that Israel was obligated to apply the main body of international 
humanitarian rules, the International Court turned to Israel’s arguments that it was not 
bound to respect the international human rights conventions it had signed and ratified as 
far as its actions in the occupied territories were concerned. The three main international 
human rights instruments of concern to the Court were: the 1966 International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (“CRC”). Noting that Israel was party to all three instruments, the ICJ held that 
these conventions apply both in peacetime and during armed conflict, limited only by 
their derogation clauses.52 All three instruments, moreover, had already been construed 
by their interpretive bodies to clearly extend to areas outside a state’s territory but under 
its effective jurisdiction or control.53 With respect to Israel, two United Nations bodies – 
the Human Rights Committee, and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights – had already rejected Israel’s position taken before those bodies that the 
provisions of these covenants did not apply in the occupied territories.54
                                                
50 Advisory Opinion, at para. 101. 
 The Court stated 
all three treaties were fully applicable to Israel’s treatment of Palestinians in the 
51 The Court’s conclusions on the applicability of the 1907 Hague Regulations were reinforced by the 
Israeli Supreme Court decision of 30 May 2004, concerning Israeli military actions in Rafah, Gaza, in 
which the Court found that such actions were clearly governed by Hague Convention IV, to which the 1907 
Regulations are annexed, and by the Fourth Geneva Convention. HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Hum. Rts. v. 
Commander of the IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/640/047/a03/04047640/a03.pdf.  
52 Advisory Opinion, at para. 106. 
53 Id. at paras. 109, 112. 
54 Id. at paras. 110, 112.  
territories and in East Jerusalem, and then turned to the questions of what specific 
provisions of these humanitarian and human rights law instruments were triggered by the 
wall regime.  
 
Having found that all of these treaties and conventions applied, the ICJ ruled that the 
construction of the Wall in the occupied territories contravened both international 
humanitarian and human rights law. In doing so, the Court rejected Israel’s arguments of 
necessity and self-defense, very narrowly construing those arguments under international 
humanitarian law. Setting aside Israel’s claims that building the Wall was necessary to 
deal with the threat of Palestinian terrorism, the Advisory Opinion stated: 
 
[T]he Court, from the material available to it, is not convinced that the specific course 
Israel has chosen for the wall was necessary to attain its security objectives. The wall, 
along the route chosen, and its associated regime gravely infringe a number of rights of 
Palestinians residing in the territory occupied by Israel, and the infringements resulting 
from that route cannot be justified by the military exigencies or by the requirements of 
national security or public order.55
 
 
Finding that Israel was obliged not only to stop construction, the ICJ also held that it had 
to dismantle the Wall, to terminate its breaches of international law involved in the Wall 
regime, and to nullify all related legislation and policies. In declaring the ‘wall regime’ 
illegal, the Court addressed the discriminatory process of granting permits to Jews to pass 
through the Wall gates, but denying such permits to Palestinians, and linked these 
conclusions to its findings on violations of Palestinian human rights.  
 
The heart of the Advisory Opinion was expressed in the Court’s main findings that Israel 
had breached the principle tenets of international human rights laws: 
 
…[T]he Court is of the opinion that the construction of the wall and its associated regime 
impede the liberty of movement of the inhabitants of the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(with the exception of Israeli citizens and those assimilated thereto) as guaranteed under 
Article 12, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They 
also impede the exercise by the persons concerned of the right to work, to health, to 
education and to an adequate standard of living as proclaimed in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and in the United Nations Convention 
                                                
55 Id. at para. 137. 
on the Rights of the Child. Lastly, the construction of the wall and its associated regime, 
by contributing to the demographic changes referred to [above], contravene Article 49, 
paragraph 6, of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Security Council Resolutions.56
 
 
(iii)  Strengths and Weaknesses of the Advisory Opinion, and its 
Relevance for the Principle Issues of the Conflict 
 
Inasmuch as the ICJ opinion is a watershed as the first statement by the highest 
international court in the world as to what legal principles apply to the intractable 
Palestine/Israel conflict, its practical effect on resolution of the conflict is for the future to 
decide. Much of the Advisory Opinion’s future influence will depend on the strength of 
the key legal points that the Court sought to resolve. From this perspective, there are 
aspects of the decision that are legally solid and well-analyzed, and others that are 
conclusory and without sufficiently cogent legal analysis or foundation. The 
jurisdictional discussion and conclusions are, as noted above, solid and well-grounded in 
legal precedent and UN practice. On the merits, however, the main weaknesses in the 
decision are in the analysis of the applicability of international humanitarian law and the 
laws of war, particularly concerning Israel’s claimed justifications for constructing the 
Wall: self-defense and necessity.   
 
International Humanitarian Law, and Israel’s Self-Defense and Necessity Arguments 
 
The International Court’s ruling that the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague 
Regulations were binding on Israel – the former as a matter of treaty law, and the latter as 
a matter of customary law – is fully consistent with overwhelming international legal 
consensus.57
                                                
56 Id. at para. 134. 
 The ICJ’s review of the basis of applicability of these provisions of 
international humanitarian law and the laws of war is thorough and detailed. It gives 
precise reasoning for its rejection of Israel’s ‘missing reversioner’ argument challenging 
the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and there is no disagreement 
57 Israel ratified the Fourth Geneva Convention in July 1951, with no reservation concerning the 
Convention’s applicability in territories under Israel’s control but outside of its borders. Jordan has also 
been a party to the Fourth Geneva Convention since May 1951. Palestine made a unilateral declaration on 
June 7, 1982, that it would apply the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
amongst the judges on this conclusion.58 More important than the consensus of the 
justices is that their conclusion on the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention is 
supported by the weight of legal authority—Israel has, in fact, been the sole proponent of 
the argument that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply as a legal matter to its 
actions in the Occupied Territories.59
 
  
However, the Court’s subsequent analysis of exactly which provisions Israel has 
breached by construction of the Wall is less satisfactory. The ICJ recites at length many 
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulations which it states 
are applicable to the issue, but focuses only on Articles 49 and 53 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, and Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague Regulations as the basis for its findings 
of Israeli breaches.60  Many of the additional provisions of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and The Hague Regulations raised by the various parties, or in the record 
before the Court, are recited in the opinion, but none are clearly stated or analyzed as 
grounds for  its conclusions.61
                                                
58 The Court’s analysis underlying its conclusion that Israel is fully bound to the provisions of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention included a review of the plain language of both paragraphs of Art. 2 concerning when 
the Convention applies, and the travaux preparatoires explaining the drafting of those provisions under 
normal treaty interpretation prescribed by Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT). See Advisory Opinion, at paras. 94, 95.    
 As Judge Higgins pointed out, the Court’s discussion of 
the violations of international humanitarian law is ‘somewhat light.’ Among the 
important provisions that the Court should have discussed in detail but did not, relate to 
Israel’s self-defense and necessity justifications. It is precisely the ‘light’ treatment on 
59 Resolutions of both the UN General Assembly and Security Council reflect the virtual unanimity of the 
international community of states that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to the Occupied Territories, 
and bind Israel in its actions there. The Court cites the significant resolutions, inter alia, UNGA Res. 56/60 
(10 Dec. 2001); UNGA Res. 58/97 (9 Dec. 2003); UNSC Res. 237 (14 June 1967); UNSC Res. 271 (15 
Sept. 1969); UNSC Res. 446 (22 March 1979); UNSC Res 681 (20 Dec. 1990); UNSC Res. 799 (18 Dec. 
1992); UNSC Res. 904 (18 March 1994), all affirming the obligations of Israel, as occupying power, to 
abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention in the Occupied Arab Territories.  
60 Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits both transfer of the occupying power’s own 
civilian population into territory it occupies, as well as forcible transfers of persons from occupied areas 
into other areas. Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits destruction of individual or 
collective property in occupied areas by the occupier, unless these are made ‘absolutely necessary by 
military operations.’ The Court found these to be the main provisions breached by the establishment and 
expansion of Israeli settlements, as well as the confiscation of Palestinian property and their forced removal 
for construction of the Wall. See Advisory Opinion, at, paras. 120-122; 126, 132-135.  
61 See Higgins Opinion, at para. 23.  
these claims, in particular, that makes the opinion most vulnerable to attack, and weakens 
its contribution to the development of positive law bearing on the conflict.  
 
The two important provisions relevant to Israel’s claimed justification that the Wall is a 
necessary response to Palestinian terrorism are Articles 23(g) and 46 of the Hague 
Regulations. These provisions were raised both in the report of the Special Rapporteur 
John Dugard submitted by the Secretary-General, and by several participants.  These two 
provisions prohibit destruction, seizure, or confiscation of private property, but 23(g) has 
a ‘military necessity’ exception.62 Article 23(g) appears in the section of the Hague 
Regulations that applies to times of hostility (Section II), while Article 46 applies to the 
extension of military occupation (Section III). The Court, in a terse conclusion without 
explanation, found that: “Only Section III is currently applicable in the West Bank and 
Article 23(g) of the Regulations, in Section II, is thus not pertinent.”63
 
 However, there is 
not as clear a demarcation between the applicability of Sections II and III of the Hague 
Regulations as the Court seemed to suggest, and the Court fails to clarify why only 
Section II is applicable.  
A number of authoritative reports have claimed that the Israel/Palestine conflict involves 
both an occupation and a state of hostilities, thus triggering the application of both 
sections of the Regulations. By summarily dismissing Article 23(g), the Court set aside 
one of the main provisions on which Israel’s self-defense argument for confiscating 
Palestinian land might be based.64
                                                
62 Art. 23(g) prohibits ‘destruction or seizure of enemy property, unless such destruction or seizure is 
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.’ Article 46 states that ‘private property cannot be 
confiscated.’ 
 The Court dismissed other ‘necessity’ defenses based 
63 See Advisory Opinion, at para. 124.  
64 There is a significant difference of opinion amongst authoritative commentators about whether Israel’s 
confiscation of Palestinian property in the occupied territories can be justified as a matter of military 
necessity under the Hague Regulations provisions. The Court did not engage in detailed analysis or related 
fact-finding to determine whether the violence in the OPTs was at the level  of an ‘armed conflict’ such that 
Section II, and hence Art. 23(g), could be triggered? If the necessity defense of the Hague Regulations was 
arguably available to Israel, then the Court should have engaged in the detailed analysis and balancing 
necessary to determine whether that defense would have excused some, or all, of Israel’s actions in 
confiscating Palestinian property to build the Wall. For contrasting views on this argument, see David 
Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International Humanitarian Law, (2005), 99 
AJIL 88 and Ardi Imseis, Critical Reflections on the International Humanitarian Law Aspects of the ICJ 
Wall Advisory Opinion (2005), 99 AJIL 102.    
on specific provisions, even when it found those provisions were violated – such as 
Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the destruction of property 
‘except when militarily necessary.’65
 
  The Court was thus left with two main arguments 
supporting Israel’s justifications: the argument of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, and the more general defense of necessity in international law, not specific to 
one or other of the applicable Conventions. 
The International Court’s treatment of Israel’s claim that its construction of the wall was 
justified as a defensive measure under Article 51 of the UN Charter is, at best, 
inadequately explained, and, at worst, incorrect. The Court concluded, in one rather terse 
paragraph, that Article 51 was not available to Israel as a defense, and nothing in the two 
Security Council resolutions concerning the use of force after September 11, changed this 
conclusion.66 There were two reasons why the Court said Article 51 did not apply: first, it 
found that Article 51 applied to self-defense of one state when there is an armed attack by 
another state, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories were not a state. Second, the Court 
found that, since the threat to Israel comes from an area in which it is Israel herself that 




Concerning the first point – that Article 51 only applies in cases of armed attack on a 
state by another state – it cannot be legally accurate without additional qualification. 
Article 51 does not have such limiting language, and has not been understood to apply 
only in cases of attacks by other states. The Court’s own jurisprudence reflects that 
attacks by non-state actors could constitute an armed attack to trigger self-defense under 
                                                
65 See Advisory Opinion, at para. 126. The Court also did not engage in a detailed discussion of why the 
necessity defense of Article 53, as well as Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, did not cover 
Israel’s actions. The defense of necessity, as a matter of both these treaty and customary law principles, 
would require either a strict or loose balancing test between the military needs of the occupier and the 
protection of civilians, often articulated as a ‘five-prong test,’ See discussion below on the Israeli High 
Court Judgment; see also, Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, The Separation 
Barrier and International Humanitarian Law: Policy Brief 6 (July 2004), available at: 
http://www.ihlresearch.org.   
66 Article 51 of the UN Charter states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, 
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”) . 
67 Id. 
Article 51.68 Judges Higgins and Buergenthal, in their separate opinions, make this point. 
If the Court’s point here relates to its second conclusion, that Israel is in control in the 
OPTs, and hence cannot claim both self-defense under Article 51 and the right to use the 
means allowed it as an occupying power, the Court may be correct.69
The Fourth Geneva Convention permits forcible measures against civilian populations, 
subject to strict limits. That exhausts the legal rights of an Occupying Power. A State 
may not use all of its powers under the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Laws of War 
and then decide that those powers are inadequate and invoke that more general right of 
self-defence, which belongs to the jus ad bellum, in order to avoid the constraints of 
international humanitarian law.
  However, there is 
no clarity on the issue in the Advisory Opinion itself, and no explanation of the 
interrelationship between the two possible lines of argument: one applying to the laws of 
war, or when a state may take up arms, and the laws in war or humanitarian law under the 
Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions. The Court might have meant that Israel 
could not use self-defense as a justification under both types of legal authority, as they 




Concerning the second point – the applicability of Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 
1373 – the Court dismissed it simply by saying that these resolutions did not apply to 
threats to a state that emanated from an area which that state is occupying. Security 
Council Resolution 1368, passed on Sept. 12, 2001 in response to the attacks on the 
World Trade Center in New York, reaffirmed the right to use of “all means” to combat 
“threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,” in individual or 
collective self defense. Security Council Resolution 1373 was passed on Sept. 28, 2001, 
to similar effect. There has been tremendous controversy about the meaning of these 
Resolutions, and whether they signal a paradigm shift in terms of when, and how, self-
                                                
68 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ 
Rep. 14 (June 27).  
69 The essence of this argument has to do with the relationship with jus ad bellum, or the right to wage war, 
and jus ad bello, or rights once war has commenced. Article 51 governs the circumstances in which states 
have the right to use arms as a means of self-defense, while the Hague Regulations and Geneva 
Conventions govern once conflict has begun. Whether these two sets of rules are mutually exclusive, or 
whether aspects of both can apply simultaneously, is not clear under state practice or in the authoritative 
commentary. For a detailed discussion of the issues raised by these two sets of principles and the ICJ’s 
failure to clarify the debate on them, see Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory 
Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ? (2005), 99 AJIL 62; cf Iain Scobbie, Words my Mother never Taught 
Me—“In Defense of the International Court,” (2005), 99 AJIL 62.   
70 Palestine Written Statement, at 233-34, at para. 534.  
defense can be used under Article 51 of the Charter. The Court did not engage in any 
discussion to clarify the meaning of these Resolutions, and whether they reflected an 
expansion of the right of self-defense. Judge Kooijmans, in his separate opinion, rightly 
pointed out the dilemma with the Court’s sparse reasoning, although agreeing with the 
Court’s conclusion that self-defense was not available to Israel under Article 51: 
Resolutions 1368 and 1273 recognize the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence without making any reference to an armed attack by a State. The Security 
Council called acts of international terrorism, without any further qualification, a threat to 
international peace and security which authorizes it to act under Chapter VII of the 
Charter. And it actually did so in resolution 1373 without ascribing these acts of terrorism 
to a particular State. This is the completely new element in these resolutions. This new 
element is not excluded by the terms of Article 51 since this conditions the exercise of the 
inherent right of self-defence on a previous armed attack without saying that this armed 
attack must come from another State even if this has been the generally accepted 
interpretation for more than 50 years. The Court has regrettably by-passed this new 
element, the legal implications of which cannot as yet be assessed but which marks 
undeniably a new approach to the concept of self-defence.71
 
 
Aside from self-defense under Article 51, the International Court did address the general 
‘necessity’ defense, finding such a defense generally in “some of the conventions at issue 
in the present instance,” and as a matter of customary international law. As noted, the ICJ 
did not address necessity, or military necessity, as it applied in the specific Hague or 
Geneva Convention provisions raised in the opinion, but looked only at two sources for 
such a claim: its own precedent, and the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. The Court recited the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymoros Project case72 and the ILC’s Article 25 on the Responsibility of 
States73
 
 as authority for finding that ‘necessity’ is available to defend a state’s otherwise 
wrongful conduct in very narrow circumstances. In the words of ILC Article 25, the act 
taken must be “the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a 
grave and imminent peril,” and that Israel had not met that test here.  
                                                
71 Kooijmans Opinion, at para. 35.  
72 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymoros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 1997 ICJ Rep. 7 (Sept. 25). 
73 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, Art. 25, UN Doc. 
A/56/10 (2001).  
All of the Justices concurred in the Court’s conclusion that Israel had not met the 
requirements of self-defense or necessity as a justification for constructing the Wall,, with 
Judge Buergenthal claiming that he might also agree if the record were complete enough 
to satisfy his concerns. However, in arriving at this conclusion, the Court leaves many 
necessary and logical legal steps to guesswork. The very general treatment of a complex 
issue at the heart of Israel’s claim of the Wall as a defensive measure weakens the force 
of the Advisory Opinion, and allows critics to claim that Israel’s justifications were 




The ICJ opinion recognized the Palestinians as a “people,” and acknowledged the 
Palestinians’ right to self-determination. The Court also found the Palestinian people 
entitled to exercise their right of self-determination over the territories occupied by Israel 
– the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. It squarely placed the obligation to enforce 
the Palestinian people’s rights to self-determination on the international community under 
the UN Charter: “It is also for all States, while respecting the United Nations Charter and 
international law, to see to it that any impediment, resulting from the construction of the 
wall, to the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination is brought 
to an end.”74 As well, the Court’s recognition of the Palestinian people and their right to 
self-determination was coupled with explicit recognition of the PLO’s right to appear 
before the ICJ as a legal ‘entity.’75
 
  
The strength of the Court’s finding of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination 
was uncontested amongst the justices, even by Judge Buergenthal.76 However, the 
consequences that flow from that determination, as outlined by the Court, were heavily 
debated by the judges in their separate opinions.77
                                                
74 Advisory Opinion, at para. 159. 
 Judge Kooijmans challenged the 
vagueness of the Court’s finding that the Wall “severely impedes the exercise by the 
75 Id. at paras. 41, 49, 53. 
76 Buergenthal Declaration, at para. 4 (stating that: “I accept that the Palestinian people have the right to 
self-determination and that it is entitled to be fully protected.) 
77 See Buergenthal Declaration, Kooijmans Opinion, Higgins Opinion, Elaraby Opinion.  
Palestinian people of its right to self-determination…”78 As he pointed out, “not every 
impediment to the exercise of a right is by definition a breach of that right or of the 
obligation to respect it…”79
 
  
The ICJ did not give a detailed explanation of precisely how and why the construction of 
the Wall violated Palestinian self-determination, taking into account Israel’s claims that 
the doctrines of self-defense and necessity justified the wall construction. Judge 
Buergenthal moved from the assumption that the Palestinians have a right to self-
determination to pointing out that if Israel’s right to self-defense were fully articulated 
with a stronger factual and legal record, it could preclude a finding that Palestinian self-
determination had been violated.80 Other judges claimed that Israel’s violation of 
Palestinian self-determination was ongoing, regardless of whether construction of the 
Wall was a breach of that principle or not; or that the obligation to respect and enforce 
realization of Palestinian self-determination was incumbent on the international 
community, not just Israel. Judge Kooijmans concluded on this: “In my view the Court 
could not have concluded that Israel had committed a breach of its obligation to respect 
the Palestinians’ right to self-determination without further legal analysis.”81
 
 
Perhaps more troubling are the inconsistent ways in which the International Court viewed 
the status of the ‘Palestinian people’ and the PLO, and their rights to self-determination 
in various aspects of its legal findings. On the one hand, the Court recognized Palestine 
and the PLO as international entities with observer status at the UN, granted ‘Palestine’ 
recognition to appear before the Court under its Statute, and found that Palestinians in the 
OPTs have a defined status as occupied and protected people under international 
humanitarian law. On the other hand, the Court dismissed Israel’s claims of self-defense, 
primarily on the grounds that Palestine was not a ‘state’ such that it could be found 
responsible for carrying out armed attacks against Israel under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. Judge Higgins found these inconsistent positions “formalism of an 
                                                
78 Advisory Opinion, at para. 122.  
79 Kooijmans Opinion, at para. 32. 
80 Buergenthal Declaration, at para. 4, 5.  
81 Kooijmans Opinion, at para. 32.  
unevenhanded sort,”82 and the incongruity of these positions has not been lost on critics 
of this opinion.83 Although there are sound legal explanations that reconcile these 
inconsistencies, the Court failed to clearly articulate them, thus undermining its 




Settlements as part of the Jewish claims on Palestine 
 
All Jewish settlements in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem were explicitly 
declared illegal by the Court.85  Citing Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention as 
the key provision for finding Jewish settlements illegal, the Court ruled: “[T]he Israeli 
settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (including East Jerusalem) have been 
established in breach of international law.”86  The Court went on to cite Security Council 
Resolution 446 to condemn Jewish settlements as a means of altering the ‘demographic 
composition of the Arab territories.’87
 
  
The Court’s finding that all Israeli settlements are illegal accurately reflects the weight of 
legal authority, and only Israel and a very few Israeli apologists in legal academia 
continue to contest the point. 88
                                                
82 Higgins Opinion, at para. 34.  
 Long before the ICJ addressed the question, the United 
Nations Security Council and General Assembly, the parties to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, the International Committee of the Red Cross, most state governments and 
83 See, for example, Murphy, supra note 69; Wedgwood, supra note 28, at 52; and Pomerance, supra note 
28. 
84 For persuasive arguments addressing these inconsistencies, and concluding that the Court’s rulings on 
this are correct, see Richard Falk, supra note 37, at 42, and Iain Scobbie, supra note 69, at 76.  
85 The Advisory Opinion did not address the distinction often made in Israeli official, press, and academic 
commentary between ‘illegal outposts’ and ‘Israeli towns.’ 
86 Advisory Opinion, at para. 120.  
87 Id. at para. 120 (citing S.C. Res. 446, U.N. SCOR, 34th Sess., 2134th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/35 (1979) 
and calling on Israel to: “rescind its previous measures and to desist in taking any action which would 
result in changing the legal status and geographical nature and materially affecting the demographic 
composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem and, in particular, not to 
transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab territories.”). UNSC Res. 446 was 
reaffirmed by UNSC Res. 452 (20 July 1979) and 465 (1 March 1980).  
88 Among them would be Ruth Wedgwood, who recites Israel’s arguments that the legal status of 
settlements is ‘disputed,’ and characterizes the transfer of Israeli settlers into the OPTs as ‘voluntary 
settlement of nationals on an individual basis.’” See Wedgwood, supra note 28, at p. 60.  
Comment [sma1]:  
commentators had achieved consensus that Israeli settlements in the OPT’s were a 
violation of international law.  The Advisory Opinion substantially recites this body of 
authority. The Court’s main basis for finding all Israeli settlement activity illegal is 
Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.89 This provision states: “The Occupying 
Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it 
occupies.”90
 
  The ICJ went on to conclude that this language prohibits both forcible 
transfers of the occupier’s population, as well as “any measures” that the occupying 
power might take to transfer parts of its population into the occupied areas.  The Court’s 
opinion then linked the illegality of settlement construction to the Wall regime as 
measures violating Palestinian self-determination, as well as a series of other rights.  
There are even problems here. The Advisory Opinion’s linking of the illegality of Israeli 
settlements to violations caused by construction of the Wall is imprecise, and leaves 
many questions unanswered.  The Court does not detail how, or why, the Wall 
construction is related to illegal settlements. The ICJ suggests, but does not determine, 
that Israel’s motivation in building the wall was to expand and entrench illegal 
settlements and permanently annex additional Palestinian territory. In fact, on the record 
before the Court, such a conclusion may not have been possible. The Court also suggests 
that Israel is prohibited from taking any measures to protect its settler population residing 
in occupied territory, but does not analyze which humanitarian law principles so prohibit. 
Although the Court may be right on these conclusions, the weakness of its analysis fuels 
ongoing controversy over these very critical points.91
 
  
International Human Rights Law and its Applicability in the OPT’s 
 
On the issue of the applicability of the primary international human rights treaties to 
Israel’s actions in the OPTs, the Advisory Opinion settled two main points: whether 
                                                
89 Advisory Opinion, at para. 120. 
90 Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 49(6). 
91 Among the detailed commentaries concluding that Israel has no legal right to construct the Wall, 
confiscate property, and use other measures affecting the rights of the Palestinian population in order to 
protect or expand its settlements, see Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, The 
Separation Barrier and International Humanitarian Law: Briefing Paper (February 2004); and Imseis, 
Critical Reflections, supra note 64, at 112-113. 
human rights law continues to apply when humanitarian law principles are triggered in 
time of hostilities; and whether the human rights treaty provisions apply extraterritorially. 
Answering both questions in the affirmative, the Court quite carefully reviews its own 
jurisprudence, the interpretations and practice of the relevant treaty bodies themselves, as 
well as the drafting history of the human rights conventions. Israel’s contention that the 
main human rights treaties discussed in this case – the International Covenant of Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) – do not 
apply in the OPTs has been a long-standing dispute between the treaty bodies entrusted 
with enforcing the Conventions and Israel. However, this contention is a distinctly 
minority position, based primarily on the premise that it is humanitarian law that applies 
as lex specialis (special law) to the conflict, and therefore human rights law does not 
apply. The United States and Israel have been the main proponents of this position.92
 
 
Noting that Israel is the only state involved in the Advisory Opinion proceedings that 
contested the applicability of human rights treaties in the OPTs, the ICJ’s reading on both 
issues has solid legal basis.93  Indeed, none of the judges on the case disagreed. Here 
again, however, the application of the precise provisions of the treaties that the Court 
discusses, is light, although thoroughly supported in their conclusions by a plethora of 
treaty body concluding observations and special rapporteur reports on Israel’s violation 
of the cited rights in general, and how the Wall construction further violates those rights. 
The Court cites a number of articles in all three human rights covenants and convention 
articles – including provisions guaranteeing freedom of movement, the right to work, the 
protection of families and children, and the right to an adequate standard of living, health 
and education – were “impeded” by the Wall.94
                                                
92 See Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed 
Conflict and Military Occupation, (2005), 99 AJIL 119. 
  Despite its rather comprehensive listing 
93 Israel ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child on October 3, 1991. 
The Court cited The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (1996 ICJ Rep.) 
226, to conclude that, in general, ‘protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of 
armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind found in Article 4 of the 
[ICCPR]’: Advisory Opinion, at para. 106.   
94 The Court cites and discusses ICCPR Art. 12 (‘everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, 
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence’) and Art. 
of which human rights provisions the Court considered Israel was violating, the Court 
analyzed only Article 12 of the ICCPR in any detail. However, the Court did review and 
summarize its factual findings from both the state submissions and the authoritative UN 
reports to show how the cited provisions were being breached, and the impact the Wall 
construction was making on the individual rights of the Palestinian population. Yet, with 
Judge Higgins’ complaint in mind, the Court could have been much clearer about which 
of these rights were actually breached by construction of the Wall, and in precisely what 
manner.   
 
Remedies for Violations, and Obligations of the International Community to Resolving 
the Conflict 
 
In what may be the most far-reaching aspect of its ruling, the Court concluded that there 
were not only international legal obligations binding the parties to the conflict, but 
additional erga omnes obligations—or obligations that are the “concern of all states.”95 
Citing Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, the Advisory Opinion ruled that all 
states are obliged not to recognize the illegal situation arising from the Wall, including 
the cessation of any assistance and aid to Israel that would be used to support its 
construction and regime.96
Given the character and the importance of the rights and obligations involved, the Court 
is of the view that all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation 
resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
 The ICJ found that state parties to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 1949 have obligations to ensure that Israel complies with the provisions of 
international humanitarian law in the occupied territories:  
                                                                                                                                              
17 (‘no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence…’); ICESCR Arts. 6 & 7 (guaranteeing the right to work), Art. 10 (rights of family, 
protection of children and young people), Art. 11 (rights to adequate standard of living, and the right to be 
free from hunger), Art. 12 (right to health), and Arts. 13 & 14 (right to education); CRC  Arts. 16 
(prohibition of arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home), Art. 24 (right to highest attainable 
standard of health and medical treatment), Art. 27 (right to adequate standard of living for physical, mental 
and social development), and Art. 28 (right to education). See Advisory Opinion, at paras. 127-131. 
95 Citing the Barcelona Traction case, the Court described obligations erga omnes as: “In view of the 
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection.” 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 
32, para. 33) (cited in Advisory Opinion, at para. 155).  
96 Common Art. 1 of the Four Geneva Conventions states: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to 
respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” 
including in and around East Jerusalem. They are also under an obligation not to render 
aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction……. In 
addition, all the Sates parties to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 are under an obligation, while 
respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by 
Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention.97
 
 
The obligation to enforce the Fourth Geneva Convention provisions applies to those 
explicitly discussed in the Advisory Opinion, such as Article 49, which prohibits 
individual or mass forcible transfers of the population of occupied territory and prohibits 
transfers of parts of its own civilian population into occupied territory.98
 
 The obligation 
also applies by extension to provisions not explicitly listed in the opinion, such as those 
requiring a state to permit persons evacuated during hostilities to return to their homes as 
soon as hostilities have ceased, which is one of the principles underlying the Palestinian 
right of return.  
The International Court found that the General Assembly and the Security Council should 
consider further actions to terminate the illegal situation resulting from the Wall 
construction in light of the Advisory Opinion. The Court’s insistence that the international 
community must act to remedy Israel’s breach of this provision, as it did in the South 
Africa precedent, can be seen as a signal for the political bodies of the UN to consider, 
among other actions, sanctions against Israel for non-compliance with the Geneva 
Conventions. Sanctions, whether through individual or collective action, should be 
carefully considered under various legal mechanisms, but might be argued as one of the 
remedies flowing from the ICJ’s opinion.99
 
  
However, as many of the judges complained, and on which Judge Kooijmans specifically 
dissented, the erga omnes obligations were not explained, and the consequences to states 
unclear. The Court did not specify whether it meant that states had any obligation beyond 
refusing to recognize an illegal action—that is, the Wall—that placed some additional 
                                                
97 Advisory Opinion, at para. 159. 
98 Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 49. 
99 See Victor Kattan, “The Wall, Obligations Erga Omnes and Human Rights: The Case for Withdrawing 
the European Community’s Terms of Preferential Trade with Israel”(forthcoming, (2006), 13 Palestine 
Y’book of Int’l. Law.)   
affirmative obligation on states. It also did not explain precisely what it meant by states 
having an obligation not to render ‘aid or assistance in maintaining the situation’ created 
by the Wall. The implications for humanitarian assistance organizations operating in the 
OPTs are left open. As Ardi Imseis observes: “[B]y failing to thoroughly examine the 
scope of common Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and to offer sound 
argumentation in support of its findings, having due regard to the practical difficulties of 
delivering international humanitarian aid and assistance in the OPT, the Court missed yet 
another opportunity to contribute to the substantive development of a highly important 
area of public international law.”100
 
 
  (iv) Some Conclusions on the Legacy of the Advisory Opinion 
 
On the wider implications of the Opinion concerning the main issues underlying the 
conflict for Palestinians—refugees, right of return, land restitution, there are four 
significant points in the ICJ decision for Palestinians. 
 
First, the Court affirmed the applicability of law to the conflict, i.e., the conflict can no 
longer be declared a purely political issue. One of the Advisory Opinion’s major 
contributions is to bring the conflict squarely back into a rights-based construct. The 
Court’s rejection of the premise that this conflict is to be determined solely on a political 
basis is a victory for those challenging the various negotiation processes from Oslo 
onwards as being political-power-based rather than rights-based. For the refugee 
question, this is a critical paradigm shift. It implies that key rights of refugees are also to 
be respected, and certainly the Court set out the legal principles on two of them: the right 




                                                
100 Imseis, supra note 64, at 117.  
101  Advisory Opinion, at paras. 150-153. 
Second, the ICJ found that Israel is responsible for making reparations for all damage 
caused by construction of the Wall.102 In this ruling, the Court affirmed Palestinians 
restitution rights under the international legal doctrine which establishes that restitution, 
and not the narrower concept of compensation, is the required remedy for wrongful 
property expropriation. The Court cited the 1928 Chorzow Factory decision of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, the critical case establishing the principle of 
restitution in international law.103 Although the restitution required by the Advisory 
Opinion was limited to property confiscated for the Wall regime, the principle is clearly 
applicable to any finding of wrongful taking, and should thus be applicable to Palestinian 
refugee property arising from 1948.104  Although the Court based the requirement of 
restitution of property on the law of state responsibility and did not refer to General 




A third important finding is the obligation the Court placed on all states-parties to the 
Fourth Geneva Convention to enforce Israel’s obligations under that Convention. One of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention articles, Article 49, which was discussed at length as the 
basis for the illegality of Jewish settlements, is also a key provision underlying the right 
of refugees to return home after hostilities forcing their displacement have ceased.106
 
  
                                                
102 Advisory Opinion, at para. 163(3)(C). 
103 See Factory at Chorzow (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13) [hereinafter Chorzow 
Factory]. The ICJ Opinion quoted relevant language from that case, including the main principle on 
restitution being the primary redress for illegal confiscation: “The essential principle contained in the actual 
notion of an illegal act…is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the 
illegal act and reestablish the situation which would…have existed if that act had not been committed. 
Restitution in kind, or if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a 
restitution in kind would bear…” Advisory Opinion, at para. 152 (citing Factory at Chorzow, supra, at 47). 
104 The clearest codification of the international legal principles governing illegal property takings are in the 
International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. These articles establish that the hierarchy 
of remedies in such cases is, first, restitution, and only if that is impossible (strictly interpreted), 
compensation, and third, if those are insufficient, ‘to give satisfaction for the injury.’ See Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, U.N. GAOR Int’l Law Comm’n, 56th Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, at chap. IV.E.1, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001). 
105 UNGA Resolution 194 is based on the principles of the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their 
homes and lands, to obtain full restitution of properties wrongfully taken by Israel, and to additional 
reparations for damages to properties that cannot physically be reclaimed. GA Res. 194 (III), U.N. GAOR, 
3d Sess., 186th Plen. Mtg., at 21 UN Doc. A/810 (1948).   
106 Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.  
Finally, there is now a clear ruling from the highest international legal authority that all of 
the principal humanitarian law and human rights treaties, the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
The Hague Regulations, the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the CRC, apply in full to Israel 
respecting its actions towards the Palestinians.  Both the ICCPR and the ICESCR were 
found to bind Israel regarding the occupied Palestinian territories, despite the occupier’s 
consistent assertions to the contrary. Both of these treaties impose substantial obligations 
on Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinian refugees, including important provisions underlying 
Palestinian refugee right of return and property restitution.107
 
  
In sum, despite the weaknesses in aspects of its analysis, the Advisory Opinion is a 
watershed in the legal history of the Palestine-Israeli conflict. The key conclusions, 
although flawed in some of their analytical foundations, are sound, not only as reflected 
by the high degree of unanimity amongst the sitting judges, but also as reflecting the 
overwhelming weight of state practice, UN resolutions, treaty body interpretations and 
learned commentary. It is important to point out that the Court’s main finding is that the 
construction of the Wall ‘in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around 
East Jerusalem, and its associated regime, are contrary to… Israel’s international 
obligations.’  In reaching this conclusion, the Court has laid out all the relevant legal 
sources, and cogent reasons to support it. The main focus of the criticism of the Opinion 
is in whether the Court should have addressed potential defenses raised by Israel, or 
analyzed the scope and reach of one or more IHL or human rights provisions; however 
helpful for clarity and analytical understanding, more was not necessary for the Court to 
find as it did. If the Court addressed issues relating to actions Israel was taking within 
Israeli territory, or specific Israeli military actions in the OPT’s, the weaknesses in the 
Court’s examination of the military necessity or self-defense arguments would have been 
far more problematic.   
 
                                                
107 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.. 
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 99 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 January 
1976).  
In the words of Richard Falk: “The Court made clear here that if this security wall had 
been located on Israeli territory rather than occupied Palestinian territory, it would not 
have been illegal. The illegality of the wall derived from its location and the resulting 
severe harm inflicted upon the scope of the Palestinian right of self-determination, as well 
as the suffering caused to those Palestinians trapped on the structure’s west side, that is, 
the Israeli side. There were no indications that if Israel had believed that it needed to 
build a wall as an aspect of defensive necessity, it could not have done so on its side of 
the Green Line rather than by constructing it in a manner that transferred to Israeli control 




Critics of the Opinion argue that it is a non-binding decision and thus of little value—an 
argument which is technically true but misses the point. The General Assembly sought an 
advisory opinion about what international law required concerning the construction of the 
Wall. In rendering such an opinion, the Court detailed what international legal principles 
apply in answering that question. The Court’s conclusions specify the legal obligations 
that bind all states involved, particularly the parties to the conflict, based on existing 
treaty and customary law. The Court’s conclusions about the nature of the legal principles 
involved are extremely helpful in clarifying aspects of the legal arguments in contention, 
but reflect pre-existing legal consensus about the principles and rights involved based on 
applicable treaties and binding legal custom.  
 
A second criticism of the Opinion is that it is merely a political one, and thus should be 
disregarded. This argument is misplaced. The Court is composed of the most highly 
qualified jurists from every geographical region in the world. The current judges hail 
from Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Japan, Jordan, Madagascar, the 
Netherlands, Russia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, the UK, the US, and Venezuela. Israel 
sought to preclude one of the two Arab judges from presiding, which the Court rejected; 
however, if there had been a real concern that the Court was too politicized, any 
participant could have sought appointment of a judge ad hoc to sit on the case, as 
                                                
108 Falk, Toward Authoritativeness, supra note 37, at 50.  
provided for by the Rules of the Court. Israel did not seek such an appointment, nor did 
any of the other participants.109
 
 The Court’s judges, on the whole, are considered 
conservative, rarely reaching beyond settled judicial authority on most questions. The 
unusual unanimity of the judges on all of the conclusions in the opinion reflects little 
politicization, but rather the strength of already-existing legal consensus on these key 
issues.  
The ICJ has reflected what the law is.110
  
 It remains for the international community and 
the UN bodies to implement the legal principles enunciated by the Court. Whether this 
Advisory Opinion will be one of many opinions from the Court that will assist in giving 
very specific guideposts for resolving the conflict as the Court’s opinions did in the South 
Africa situation depends primarily on the actions of the political bodies of the UN. 
However, whether this opinion will provide a concrete and useful framework for action 
on the ground to dismantle the Wall and its discriminatory regime depends primarily on 
how well civil society actors understand and utilize the important legal principles found 
in this decision.  
III The Israeli High Court Judgement 
 
To the extent that construction of the Fence is a military necessity, it is permitted, 
therefore, by international law. Indeed, the obstacle is intended to take the place of combat 
military operations, by physically blocking terrorist infiltration into Israeli population 
centers. The building of the obstacle, to the extent it is done out of military necessity, is 
within the authority of the military commander. Of course, the route of the Separation 
Fence must take the needs of the local population into account. That issue, however, 
concerns the route of the Fence and not the authority to erect it. 
 
   Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel, at para. 32 
 
In June 2002, when the Israeli government announced its formal decision to build an 
integrated system of walls, trenches, barriers and fences throughout the West Bank, it 
stated that the Wall was initiated solely as a response to the series of Palestinian suicide 
bombings that had killed approximately 450 Israelis since the start of the second Intifada 
                                                
109 See Owada Opinion, at para. 19, on this point.  
110 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803),  1 Cranch 137 (1803). 
in September 2000. As the magnitude, length and location of the Wall became apparent, 
especially its plans to separate hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their 
agricultural lands and social services and to include most of the Jewish settlement blocs 
on the ‘Israeli’ side of the project, Palestinian villagers began to file petitions with the 
Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court.111
 
 These petitions were supported by a 
number of Palestinian and Israeli human rights groups. Many of these petitions 
challenged not only the crude expropriation process frequently employed by the Israeli 
military and the occupation administration to seize Palestinian lands, but also the very 
legality of the Wall itself under the international law of belligerent occupation.  
The Israeli Supreme Court has a widely-accepted but rather undeserved reputation for 
judicial liberalism.112 Most of this reputation derives from its rulings in the area of civil 
rights within Israel, where it has issued affirmative judgements in cases involving gender 
and sexual orientation rights, freedom of expression, the environment, and personal 
freedoms. However, its substantial body of decisions on the occupation tells quite another 
story. The Court’s judgements have found in favour of the Israeli state in virtually every 
matter involving its rule in the Occupied Territories. The Supreme Court has consistently 
avoided ruling on the issue of whether the Fourth Geneva Convention applies de jure to 
the Territories,113 despite the virtually unanimous view of the international community.114
                                                
111 The Israeli Supreme Court wears two judicial hats. It is the final court of appeal in Israel from 
judgements of lower courts. It also serves as the High Court of Justice, through its power to issue 
prerogative writs against government agencies. For ease of explanation, we will refer to the Court as the 
Supreme Court throughout our discussion. 
 
As well, it has refused every petitioned request over the years to rule on the legal status of 
112 The Court enjoys a considerable degree of support among Israeli Jews, who in public opinion polls 
consistently rank it as the most respected civilian institution in the country.  
113  Afu v. IDF Commander of the West Bank (1993), 23 Israeli Yearbook of Human Rights [IYIL] 277 (ISC 
– Summary); Sajedia v. Minister of Defence (1993), 23 IYIL 288 (ISC – Summary). The Israeli government 
has persistently maintained that, while the Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply to the Occupied 
Territories, it will apply the humanitarian features of the Convention. This is a legal contortion, since the 
entire Convention is humanitarian law. The Israeli Supreme Court has accepted this legal fiction, most 
recently in Beit Sourik (at para. 23), which has allowed it to avoid addressing a number of issues going to 
the considerable legal obligations of an occupying authority. Having said this, the Court has accepted that 
some parts of the Fourth Geneva Convention apply to the Occupied Territories, on the grounds that they 
reflect customary international law: Center for the Defence of the Individual v. IDF Commander, H.C.J. 
3278/02 (18 December 2002). 
114 U.N.S.C. Res. 904 (18 March 1994); U.N.G.A. Res. 57/269 (5 March 2003); Declaration of the 
Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, 5 December 2001, at para. 1.  
the Israeli settlements under the Convention,115 despite the corpus of international law 
condemning them in absolute terms.116
 
 On those occasional instances where it has 
disagreed with the Israeli government, it has done so on narrow issues of administrative 
application, none of which have proven to be a significant impediment to Israel’s actions 
in the occupied territories. As the judicial handmaiden to the occupation, the Court has 
rarely attracted even principled dissents from justices brave enough to endorse the robust 
obligations of international law.  
Where the Israeli Supreme Court has applied norms of international law on belligerent 
occupation, its legal analysis has been arthritic and formalistic, leading inevitably to 
deferential and inert decisions that have legitimized the ongoing colonization of 
Palestinian lands and the perpetuation of military rule.117 Examples of this languid 
deference include seminal judgements which have permitted the building of settler 
roads,118 the deportation of Palestinian prisoners to prisons outside of the Occupied 
Territories,119 administrative detentions,120 house demolitions and collective 
punishment,121 the denial or revocation of residency status and family reunification,122 
and, until recently, torture.123
                                                
115 Amira v. Minister of Defence (“Mattityahu”) (1980), 10 IYIL 331 (IHC – Summary): Ayyub v. Minister 
of Defence (“Beit El”) (1979), 9 IYIL 337 (IHC – Summary). Even in the celebrated Elon Moreh case, 
where the Court refused to sanction the seizure of private Palestinian lands for a settlement, the Court made 
its ruling on a narrow basis, and explicitly avoided answering the question of the illegality of settlements in 
international law: Dweikat v. Government of Israel (1979), 9 IYIL 384 (IHC – Summary).  
 The manner in which Israel committed these acts is in 
116 Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.    
117 For a critical assessment of the Court’s judicial decision-making pertaining to the occupation, see David 
Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2002). 
118 Ja’amait Ascan v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria (HCJ 393/82), described in Kretzmer, id. at 
pp. 97-98. 
119 Afu v. IDF Commander of the West Bank (1993), 23 IYIL 277 (IHC—Summary); Na’azal v. IDF 
Commander in Judea and Samaria (1986), 16 IYIL 329 (IHC – Summary). 
120 Sajedia v. Minister of Defence (1993), 23 IYIL 288 (IHC – Summary). 
121 Sanuar v. IDF Commander in Gaza (1995), 25 IYIL 324 (IHC – Summary); Dujlas v. IDF Commander 
in Judea and Samaria (1987), 17 IYIL 315 (IHC – Summary). 
122 Shahin v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria (1988), 18 IYIL 241 (IHC – Summary); Al-Teen v. 
Minister of Defence (1972), described in Kretzmer, supra note 117, at pp. 103-4. 
123 In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, the Court in 1999 ruled that the 
Israeli General Security Service had no legal basis for the use of physical force when interrogating 
detainees. This ruling contrasted with earlier judgements by the Court where it had allowed the Security 
Service to apply physical force during interrogation: Mubarak v. General Security Service (1996); 
Khamdan v. General Security Service (1996); Balebisi v. General Security Service (1995); all described in 
Kretzmer, supra, note 105, at pp. 138-143.   
substantive violation of international law, which has occasionally troubled the Court, but 
has rarely impeded it from finding a legal justification.  
 
In its decisions on the occupation, the Supreme Court has shared a common narrative 
with the Israeli government and military on the origins and principle features of the 
conflict.124
 
 It accepts that the state is under attack, that the occupation has been largely 
benign, that the military and the government are motivated by security concerns and 
guided by human values, and that the benefit of any judicial doubt should be given to the 
military unless the minimal legal restraints on the occupation have been unmistakably 
ignored. These shared assumptions are particularly visible in the Court’s choice of 
language. In Beit Sourik, for example, it refers to the West Bank as “Judea and Samaria”, 
the Wall is called the “Separation Fence”, and Jewish settlements in the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem are “towns” and “neighbourhoods”. 
In front of the Supreme Court in Beit Sourik, the Palestinian petitioners raised two 
substantive legal issues in opposition to the Wall. First, they argued that, under 
international law, Israel lacked the authority to construct the Wall on territory held in 
belligerent occupation. In particular, they maintained that the Wall de facto annexes parts 
of the Occupied Territories to Israel, and serves the needs of the occupying power rather 
than those of the occupied population. Had the Wall been built on the 1949 Green Line 
rather than predominately on occupied lands, the petitioners stated, they would have had 
no objections to its existence. If that argument failed, then the petitioners advanced a 
second legal issue. They submitted that the particular route of the Wall, with its severe 
harm to hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, outweighs its security benefits, and should 
be re-located elsewhere to lessen these injuries. As evidence of the humanitarian harm, 
the petitioners pointed to the denial of access to farming lands; the expropriation of 
property; the loss of markets; the inability to reach their schools, hospitals, jobs and 
places of worship; and the degradation of the landscape.  
 
                                                
124 In particular, the immediate past and current presidents of the Israeli Supreme Court have been former 
Attorneys-General of Israel, and a number of the other justices have served as either Attorney-General or as 
State Prosecutor.     
In reply to the petitioners’ arguments, the IDF maintained that its authority to build the 
Wall was well established in Israeli law, and that every effort had been made to minimize 
any “disturbances” to the daily lives of the Palestinians. As well, a group of retired Israeli 
military officers – the Council for Peace and Security – intervened in the case. They 
submitted an affidavit which endorsed the necessity of the Wall and did not quarrel with 
its location on occupied territories. However, the Council did argue that its planned route 
compromised Israel’s security because it was placed too close to Palestinian homes and 
communities, thus making it more difficult for the IDF to effectively defend Israeli 
interests. 
 
(i)  The Israeli Supreme Court: The Legality of the Wall 
 
The President of the Israeli Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, presided over the hearings in 
Beit Sourik, and wrote the unanimous decision for the three judge panel. Dealing with the 
first question – on the IDF’s legal authority to construct the Wall – the Court accepted the 
principles and the language of international humanitarian law. It held that Israel’s rule 
over the Palestinian territories amounted to ‘belligerent occupation’ and was inherently 
temporary. It also ruled that the IDF commander could not build the Wall if the 
motivation was political or was an attempt to annex the territories. Most importantly, the 
Court stated that Israel could not build roads or make other changes to the lands it 
belligerently rules if the objective was for its own benefit, as opposed to the only two 
reasons permitted under international law: for the benefit of the local population, or for 
military and security reasons. These are all significant acknowledgements and, if applied 
purposively, the occupation and its many projects, including the Wall, would have been 
declared illegal. In the hands of the Israeli Supreme Court, however, it has proven more 
expedient to accept the principles and then deny them in practice, than to reject the 
principles.  
 
International humanitarian law and the rules of belligerent occupation are designed, first 
and foremost, to protect the interests of the local population, and to maintain the status 
quo of the occupied territories until they are returned to the new sovereign power as soon 
as reasonably possible.125 The occupying power is not permitted to develop new laws and 
structures that may change features of the pre-existing legal or social order, unless these 
changes protect or advance the welfare of the local population and do not advantage the 
occupying power beyond ensuring a more effective security and administrative regime.126 
The laws of occupation do not grant the occupying power any claim or leverage 
respecting future sovereignty over any of the lands it controls resulting from an armed 
conflict.127
 
 In particular, any acts which denote permanence or a presence beyond the 
requirements of a temporary administration are incompatible with the law. Accordingly, 
the occupying power cannot alienate lands or property, unless they are strictly and only 
for reasons of security for the military personnel, and even then only for the transitory 
period of the occupation. Security and military necessity are narrowly defined in 
international law, lest the occupier seek unwarranted benefits for itself.  
Although the Israeli Supreme Court in Beit Sourik accepted, in principle, the main tenets 
of the law of belligerent occupation, it rejected the argument of the Palestinian petitioners 
that the Wall was illegal by giving an expansive meaning to ‘security’ and a 
correspondingly lifeless definition to the obligations of an occupying authority under 
international humanitarian law. As a grounding premise, it endorsed the affidavit 
evidence of the IDF Commander, who had stated that the objective of the Wall was to 
prevent the infiltration of terrorists into Israel, and for no other reason. The Court said: 
“These are security reasons par excellence. In an additional affidavit, Major General 
Kaplinsky testified that: ‘it is not a permanent Fence, but rather a temporary Fence 
erected for security needs.’ We have no reason not to give this testimony less than full 
                                                
125 See the 1907 Hague Regulations, and particularly Articles 43 and 55. For commentary on the 
Regulations that supports this widely-held interpretation, see E. Benvenisti, The International Law of 
Occupation (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004); and I. Scobbie, “Natural Resources and 
Belligerent Occupation: Mutation Through Permanent Sovereignty” in S. Bowen, Human Rights, Self-
Determination and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
the Hague, 1997).  
126 Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
127 This principle has been at the core of post World War II international law, and it expressly stated in 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (22 November 1967): “Emphasizing the inadmissibility of 
the acquisition of territory by war…”.  
weight, and we have no reason not to believe the sincerity of the military commander.”128
 
 
As has been its habit, the Supreme Court turned a blind eye to the historical record of the 
occupation that there is rarely anything so permanent as a temporary Israeli installation 
on Palestinian lands.  
With this minimal security threshold satisfied, the Supreme Court proceeded to reject the 
arguments of the Palestinian petitioners that the confiscation of private lands for the 
erection of the Wall was illegal. Ignoring the exacting requirements for the protection of 
the private property of the occupied population under international law,129 the Court cited 
a supportive, if telling, legal authority for its ruling: its own substantial prior caselaw. Its 
past rulings had authorized the expropriation of private Palestinian lands to build roads, 
settlements, barriers, administrative offices, and military facilities in the name of the 
occupation.130 In effect, this body of decisions has turned the international humanitarian 
principle that all belligerent occupations are inherently temporary into the opposite of its 
intended purpose. Rather than constrict the operations of the occupying authority because 
its rule is suppose to be transitory, the Israeli Supreme Court has habitually used the 
obligation of ‘temporariness’ to accept virtually all of the transformative acts that the 
Israeli government and the IDF have accomplished in the occupied territories.131
                                                
128 Beit Sourik, at para. 29.  The Court also accepted the Israel government’s word that the Wall was 
motivated only by security concerns: “As we have seen in the government decisions concerning the 
construction of the Fence, the government has emphasized, numerous times, that ‘the Fence, like the 
additional obstacles, is a security measure. Its construction does not express a political border, or any other 
border.’” (para. 28) 
 If the 
Wall or a settlement or a military installation is labeled as temporary by the IDF or the 
Israeli government, then, regardless of the probable permanence of its structure and 
intent, the Court will bless its formal compliance with international law, and refrain from 
129 See generally Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Regulations:  “Private property cannot be confiscated.” 
International law permits the requisition of private lands and property, if it is meant solely for the military 
and administrative requirements of the occupation, but, consistent with the temporary character of 
occupation, such properties are to be returned to their rightful owners upon the termination of the 
occupation.   
130 Beit Sourik, at para. 32.  
131 According to B’Tselem, the Israeli State Attorney’s office said to the Israeli Supreme Court in 2002, 
when defending the initial seizure orders to expropriate private Palestinian lands to construct the Wall, that 
Israel is only taking control of the lands temporarily. The seizure orders were valid only until the end of 
2005. However, the military legal regime governing the occupied territories permits the indefinite extension 
of these orders, which is the IDF’s common practice regarding lands seized for new settlements or for by-
pass roads. B’Tselem, Behind the Barrier (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 2003), at p. 34.   




The largest hole in the heart of the Beit Sourik decision on the first issue was the Court’s 
astounding silence on the routing of the Wall to encompass the bulk of the Israeli 
settlement blocs. The petitioners had argued that, if the Wall had been primarily 
motivated by security considerations, it would have not been built predominately inside 
the occupied territories. This, they maintained, demonstrated the unacceptably political 
nature of the Wall, and thus its illegality.133 However, the argument that proved so 
persuasive at the International Court of Justice was succinctly rejected by the Israeli 
Supreme Court. With a dismissive wave of its hand, it held: “We have no reason to 
assume that the objective is political rather than security-based.”134 In arriving at this 
evidence-free finding, the Court did not mention the settlements in this part of the 
decision, it did not question the dense web of settler-only roads in the occupied 
territories, nor did it ask why many of the largest settlements were to be located on the 
‘Israeli’ side of the Wall. Unlike the ICJ,135 and even leading Israeli political leaders,136
 
 
the Supreme Court identified no symmetry among the various aspects of the occupation, 
preferring to view the Wall, the settlements, and the regime of military occupation in 
splendid isolation from each other.  
                                                
132 In a decision released shortly before Beit Sourik, the Court stated in Na’aleh v. Civil Administration of 
Judea and Samaria (HCJ 9717/03, 14 June 2004) that: “When we deal with very long periods of time, it 
seems it is justified to recognize the authority of the occupant state to take actions that will affect the 
territory under belligerent occupation for a long time.” 
133 According to the Senat think tank in Israel, building the Wall on the Green Line would also have cut its 
length and its cost in half: “Cost of fence could be halved if built along 1967 lines” Ha’aretz, 2 April 2004.   
134 Beit Sourik, at para. 31. 
135 Advisory Opinion, at para. 120 
136 For a prescient view of the relationship between the Wall and the settlements, see the remarks of Israeli 
Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in support of the Israeli government’s unilateral disengagement 
strategy combined with the construction of the Wall, quoted and described in Ha’aretz, 14 November 2003: 
“ ‘[The] formula for the parameters of a unilateral solution are: To maximize the number of Jews; to 
minimize the number of Palestinians; not to withdraw to the 1967 border and not to divide Jerusalem.’ 
Large settlements such as Ariel would ‘obviously’ be carved into Israel. …The fence, now being built amid 
much controversy, would ‘ultimately become part of the unilateral plan’, Olmert says with deliberate 
vagueness…[H]is unilateralism ‘would inevitably preclude a dialogue with the Palestinians for at least 25 
years.’ ”   
Once the legal awkwardness of the settlements question, and the demographic and 
territorial intentions of the Israeli political leadership, had been judicially airbrushed, the 
Supreme Court had little trouble in re-affirming the security Weltanschauung that it 
shares with the government and the military. It stated: “We cannot accept this argument 
[that the Wall’s objectives are political]. The opposite is the case: It is the security 
perspective – and not the political one – which must examine a route based on its security 
merits alone, without regard for the Green Line.”137 This was a direct echo of the position 
adopted by the Israeli cabinet two years previously, when then Minister of the Interior Eli 
Yishai successfully recommended that: “the fence’s route not coincide with the Green 
Line, but that it be as far away as possible so that it will indeed be a security, and not a 
political, separation fence.”138 According to the Court’s reasoning, had the Wall been 
built on the 1967 border, it would have become a political structure, and therefore, in its 
eyes, illegal. A dynamic linguistic process is evident here: over the years, the Supreme 
Court has instructed the Israeli political and military leadership on the proper terminology 
to use when defending its projects in the occupied territories in order to pass the Court’s 
judicial litmus test (“security”; “temporary”; “military necessity”; “the humanitarian 
features of the Fourth Geneva Convention”), and, in their subsequent appearances before 
the Court, they have learnt the lesson well.139
 
 
In reaching the conclusion that the Wall’s route was for security purposes only, the Israeli 
Supreme Court adopted the untenable legal assumption that an occupying power is 
permitted to take a broad range of security actions to defend the state’s interests, 
including erecting civilian settlements in occupied lands. In contrast, the strong 
consensus in international law excludes from the coverage of the circumscribed definition 
of security any action, even if it is military or security in scope, that is ulterior to the bona 
                                                
137 Beit Sourik, at para. 30. 
138 “Shas: Include More Communities West of the Fence” Ha’aretz, 4 July 2002. Cited in B’Tselem, 
Behind the Barrier, supra note 131, at p. 31. 
139 A prime example of this lesson arose from the 1979 Elon Moreh decision, supra note 115. The Israeli 
Supreme Court refused to accept the military requisition of private Palestinian land for a settlement in the 
West Bank, on the grounds that the purpose of the requisition was for ‘political’ rather than ‘security’ or 
‘military’ reasons. Following the decision, the Israeli government has built its settlements on ‘public lands’ 
in the occupied territories, and has never formally labeled its settlement activities in the occupied territories 
as ‘political’ before any domestic legal forum. Following Elon Moreh, the Supreme Court has not 
subsequently issued a ruling against the legality of a settlement. 
fide administrative and military necessities of the occupying power and not in conformity 
with the foreseeable termination of its rule of occupation.140 Security cannot be used as a 
pretext for acquiring advantages otherwise forbidden to the occupying power. Yet, in its 
elastic definition of security, the Supreme Court absorbed and implicitly endorsed a 
primary raison d’etre of the Israeli settlement project: the establishment of a critical mass 
of settlers in the occupied territories to justify a sustained military and political presence 
in order to provide ‘security’ for the privileged minority.141 Thus, only by misconstruing 
international law could the Court conclude that: “To the extent that construction of the 
Fence is a military necessity, it is permitted, therefore, by international law.”142
 
 
 (ii)  The Israeli Supreme Court: The Routing of the Wall 
 
Having decided that the IDF Commander had the legal authority to construct the Wall in 
the occupied territories, the Israeli Supreme Court then turned to the second, narrower, 
issue before it: whether the Wall’s actual and proposed route through Palestinian lands 
properly balanced Israel’s military requirements in the occupied territories against the 
needs of the ‘local population’. This analysis is known in international law and 
constitutional law circles as the proportionality test. As commonly applied, the test 
requires a court to measure an armed force’s actions or a government’s justifications 
against another vital purpose, such as humanitarian obligations, human rights or 
democratic values, in order to assess its legitimacy. However, this test is susceptible to 
different approaches. Some legal commentators have stated that, in international law, the 
humanitarian purpose is foremost, and the military justifications must be interpreted 
strictly and narrowly. In their eyes, the proportionality test is less a balancing exercise 
than it is a broad rule of protection (humanitarian) with circumscribed exceptions 
                                                
140 The Official Commentary to Article 53 (dealing with the prohibition against the destruction of private or 
public property in the occupied territories) warns that “unscrupulous recourse to the clause concerning 
military necessity would allow the Occupying Power to circumvent the prohibition set forth in the 
Convention.” 
141 Moshe Dayan, one of the primary architects of Israel’s settlement policy, stated in 1979 that the 
settlements were necessary “not because they can ensure security better than the army, but because without 
them we cannot keep the army in these territories.  Without settlements, the IDF would be merely an 
occupying army in these occupied territories.” Jerusalem Post, 11 April 1979.  
142 Beit Sourik, at para. 32. 
(military necessity).143 Other legal commentators would place comparatively greater 
weight on the military justifications, and define the test more as a balancing act between 
two equivalent and legitimate values.144
 
  
The Israeli Supreme Court has long adopted the later view. While this more pliable 
version of the test still retains some teeth, which the Court would employ in Beit Sourik, 
it provides a diminished defence of the humanitarian purpose that lies at the heart of the 
laws of belligerent occupation. Indeed, in its prior caselaw, the Court had applied a limp 
and troubling interpretation of the proportionality test. Most controversially, it has used 
its version of the test to justify the punitive demolitions of homes belonging to the 
families and relatives of persons suspected of engaging in resistance or terrorists acts.145 
Although international humanitarian law expressly forbids the collective punishment of 
the protected population for the deeds of an individual or a group,146 and prohibits the 
destruction of real or personal property of the state or individuals “except where such 
destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations,”147 the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly ruled that the concept of deterrence justified the practice, even when 
little reliable evidence was produced to establish this.148 B’Tselem has described the 
Supreme Court as acting like a “rubber stamp” for the Israeli government on home 
demolitions.149
                                                
143 Alain Pellet, “The Destruction of Troy Will Not Take Place”, in Emma Playfair, (ed.) International Law 
and the Administration of Occupied Territories (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992), at p. 196.  
 What the Court disregarded in these cases was that the proportionality test 
was inappropriate to apply in the case of collective punishments (the prohibition admits 
144 Y. Dinstein, “Legislative Authority in the Administrated Territories” (1979), 2 Iyunei Mishpat 505 
(“The law of war usually creates a delicate balance between two poles: military necessity on one hand and 
humanitarian considerations on the other”) Cited in Beit Sourik, at para. 34. 
145 According to the eminent Israeli political historian Tom Segev, “In the history of the Israeli occupation, 
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from its image as the stronghold for the defence of human rights.” Ha’aretz, 30 June 2005. 
146 Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the punishment of a protected person for an 
offence that he or she did not commit: “Collective penalties…are prohibited.”   
147 Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
148 Farj v. IDF Commander (HCJ 893/04); Turkman v. Minister of Defence (1995), 25 IYIL 347 (IHC – 
Summary). Since October 2000, the IDF had demolished 675 homes for punitive purposes, leaving more 
than 4,000 homeless. The IDF announced in February 2005 that it was ending the practice of punitive home 
demolitions, because it proved not to be a deterrent. Israeli political historian Tom Segev has written that: 
“The army, out of a cost-benefit calculation, adopted a more humane policy than the [Supreme] Court 
would ever have dared to impose on it.” Ha’artez, 30 June 2005. 
149 “B’Tselem: High Court ‘rubber stamp’ for IDF house demolitions”, Ha’aretz, 15 November 2004. 
no exceptions, therefore a balancing approach does not arise), and that the exception to 
the interdiction against property destruction is limited to “imperative military 
requirements”,150 and does not include the broad operational security measures of the 
IDF which the Court has regularly approved.151
 
   
The version of the proportionality test used by the Israeli Supreme Court in Beit Sourik 
consisted of three cumulative requirements. (The inability to satisfy even one of them 
would result in the failure to meet the test.) First, the Court had to determine whether 
there was a reasonable relationship between the end objective (security) and the means 
used to reach that end (the Wall). The second part of the test required the Israeli 
government to show that the Wall would cause the least possible impairment: stated 
another way, were there other, less injurious, means available to accomplish the end 
objective? The third part required the Court to ask itself: was the increased security 
gained from the chosen route of the Wall proportional to the harm imposed upon the local 
Palestinian population?  
 
This three-part version is consistent with the requirements of international law, but 
incomplete. The more robust proportionality test includes two additional cumulative 
parts: (1) Is the occupying power facing an actual and pressing state of necessity? and (2) 
Does the measure in question violate an absolute prohibition in international 
humanitarian law?152
                                                
150 Official Commentary on Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, provided by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross.  
 Addressing all five issues in a purposeful fashion would have 
almost certainly lead a liberal court to find that the Wall was so disproportionately 
harmful to humanitarian objectives in comparison to military necessities that its very 
construction would fail the test. Asking only some of these questions, and filtering them 
151 For a critical review of the Supreme Court’s caselaw in this area, see Kretzmer, The Occupation of 
Justice, supra, note 117, at chap. 9; and B’Tselem, Through No Fault of Their Own: Punitive House 
Demolitions during the al-Asqa Intifata (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 2004).  
152 For a detailed explanation of these principles in their robust fashion, see the work of the International 
Humanitarian Law Research Initiative of the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict 
Research, found in “The Separation Barrier and International Humanitarian Law: Policy Brief # 6, supra 
note 65. 
through a judicial lens that gives an elevated emphasis to the security interests of the 
occupier, would inevitably result in a much more constrained conclusion.  
 
Turning to the first part of its version of the proportionality test – whether there existed a 
rational connection between the underlying purpose of the Wall and its chosen route – the 
Supreme Court in Beit Sourik paid serious attention only to the views of the IDF 
commander and the ever-so-slightly dissenting views on the security route of the Wall 
expressed by the Council for Peace and Security, the grouping of retired Israeli military 
officers. The Court ruled, as it had traditionally done in prior security cases, that it would 
grant particular deference to the views of the IDF commander: “All we can determine is 
whether a reasonable military commander would have set out the route as this military 
commander did.”153 (In doing so, the Court made a significant assumption that the route 
of the Wall was determined entirely or largely by military judgements. This assumption, 
however consistent it is with its view that the Wall is a security exercise par excellence, 
neglects the decisive role played by the Israeli cabinet in not only approving the various 
stages of the Wall project, but also in supervising the details of its path through the 
occupied territories.)154
 
 Accordingly, as this part of the test requires only the 
establishment of a ‘rational connection’ between means and ends, it is unsurprising that 
the Court found that the IDF had satisfied this initial part of the test. 
Similarly, on the second leg of the test – whether there were less harmful alternatives 
available to the IDF which would achieve the same security goal – the Court held that 
proportionality had also been established. This was a more troubling finding. Even 
accepting the contentious premise that Israel could legally erect security defenses for its 
civilian settlements in occupied territories, other effective methods far less injurious to 
the Palestinians were available to the IDF. B’Tselem, the Israeli human rights 
organization, has argued that the Wall actually presents “the most extreme solution that 
                                                
153 Beit Sourik, at para. 46.  
154 At a cabinet meeting in February 2005, after the Beit Sourik ruling, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon led his 
political colleagues through a detailed decision-making process on the route of the Wall. According to 
Ha’aretz (“Israel’s new frontier”, 25 February 2005). 
causes the greatest harm to the local population.”155 The alternative measures that Israel 
could have employed, but did not, would include increasing the effectiveness of roadside 
checkpoints, providing greater security coverage in the ‘seam zone’ around the Green 
Line, or erecting better fortification around the settlements.156
 
 Yet, the Supreme Court 
again expressed its deference to the military-security views of the IDF, and displayed no 
evident curiousity about the other alternatives.  
However, on the third prong of the test – whether the Wall’s harm to humanitarian 
interests outweigh its security benefits – the Court found that segments of the forty 
kilometres of the Wall under review disproportionately harmed the interests of the local 
Palestinians. A ten kilometre portion of the Wall which ran up a mountain ridge and 
placed the high ground on the Israeli side would also separate 13,000 Palestinian farmers 
from their lands and trees, in an area with an unemployment rate already approaching 
75%. As well, three other segments of this forty kilometre stretch of the Wall were found 
to cause a considerable degree of economic harm to thousands more local inhabitants. 
The Court accepted the evidence of the Council for Peace and Security that alternative 
routes existed that would move the Wall away from some of the Palestinian villages and 
still provide equivalent or even better protection for Israel and its settlements from a 
security perspective. Disputing the position of the IDF commander that the humanitarian 
concerns of the Palestinian villagers were adequately met through access gates in the 
Wall and an appeal process against land expropriation, the Court held that the “injury 
caused by the Separation Fence is not restricted to the lands of the inhabitants or to their 




Accordingly, the proportionality test failed the third leg of the test. The Supreme Court 
ordered the IDF commander to review the routing of approximately twenty-five 
kilometres of the challenged segment of the Wall, with a view to finding a path that was 
less disruptive to the Palestinian inhabitants. The IDF was also ordered to consider land 
                                                
155 “Separation Barrier”, found at: www.btselem.org/English/Separation_Barrier/ 
156 B’Tselem, Behind the Barrier, supra note 131. 
157 Beit Sourik, at para. 84. 
swaps for Palestinians who lost their properties, or, alternatively, to provide 
compensation if no alternative lands were available. The Court’s concluding statement 
that “A democracy must sometimes fight with one arm tied behind her back”158 has been 
frequently cited by sympathetic commentators in the international press as an example of 
Israel’s sensitivity to the difficult balance between law and terrorism.159 What the 
statement actually camouflages is the Supreme Court’s incessant unwillingness to 
condemn Israel’s lawless methods in confronting the Palestinian opposition to the 
occupation, including the government’s reliance on extra-judicial assassinations,160 the 
ongoing torture of prisoners,161 collective punishment,162 and the warrantless deaths of 
unarmed civilians,163
 
 all acts prohibited under international law.    
 (iii) Beit Sourik and its Limitations 
 
As a matter of both law and politics, Beit Sourik is a seminal ruling that illustrates both 
the limited possibilities and the exceptional difficulties faced by those who attempt to 
challenge the Israeli occupation through judicial means. As a legal judgement, the 
Supreme Court decision has provided a deeply flawed and unsatisfactory analysis of the 
applicable principles of belligerent occupation and humanitarian law. To its credit, the 
Court acknowledged and detailed the serious harm imposed by the Wall upon a number 
of Palestinian communities in the northern Jerusalem area, and it did order a review of a 
small portion of its route which may perhaps lessen some of the barrier’s more egregious 
consequences. The consequence of the ruling will mean that the Wall’s routing elsewhere 
on the occupied territories will have to satisfy some minimal humanitarian standards. But 
little other praise can be extended. The harm that the Court recognized was to individual 
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reported in The Guardian (UK), 28 July 2005. 
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163 See Human Rights Watch, “Promoting Impunity: The Israeli Military’s Failure to Investigate 
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Palestinians; otherwise, it maintained its customary silence on the injuries done to the 
rights of the Palestinians as a people. Indeed, the Court’s adamant refusal to confront the 
enormous elephant in the room – an occupier who repudiates both the de jure 
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention, with all of its robust protections, as well 
as the modern instruments of human rights law – has become its chronic infirmity, 




As a political expression of the law, Beit Sourik represents a difference at a tertiary level 
of the relationship between the Court and the two other central institutions of the country: 
the Israeli government and the IDF. Regarding the primary and secondary assumptions 
about the justness of Israel’s approach towards its present predicaments, all three 
institutions stand on common ground. “In the struggle between government policies and 
Palestinian arguments of rights based on justice, international legal standards, or lofty 
legal principles,” writes a leading Israeli legal scholar on the Supreme Court, “[it] has 
shown a marked preference for ‘state arguments.’”165 Some Israeli intellectuals critical of 
their own society have defended the Supreme Court as the last institutional bastion of 
moderate values in a political culture increasingly prone to intolerance.166
 
 This defence is 
not without some validity, but the anaemic caselaw produced by the Court on the 
occupation demonstrates, above all else, how a prolonged regime of subjugation over 
another people eventually corrupts democratic values and the rule of law in all of the 
leading institutions of the dominant society.   
IV  Epilogue 
The fence epitomizes Israel at the start of the 21st century. It is a massive, crude 
and destructive response to genuine distress. It embodies the modern Israeli 
spirit: the power to get things done, financial resources, good intentions and 
apathy all wrapped up in one. The fence basically amounts to an admission by the 
state that it is unable and unwilling to reach an agreement with the 
                                                
164 Meron Benvenisti has observed: “The government of Israel and the High Court of Justice [the Supreme 
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Palestinians…It is a declaration of Israeli society’s intention to close itself off 
behind ghetto walls, to give up on a connection with its neighbours and to 
disregard, because of an excessive sense of power, their needs and troubles. 
 
    Uzi Benziman, Israeli author and journalist167
 
   
In the initial weeks following the release of the Advisory Opinion and Beit Sourik, clear 
lines were drawn by significant international and regional actors with their reactions to 
the legal judgements. On 20 July 2004, the United Nations General Assembly voted 150-
6-10 to accept the ICJ ruling and to demand that “Israel, the occupying power, comply 
with its legal obligations as mentioned in the advisory opinion”.168 The UNGA resolution 
also called upon all UN members “to comply with their legal obligations as mentioned in 
the advisory opinion.” However, no stronger measures to ensure compliance were 
adopted. A month later, in Durban, South Africa, the ministerial meeting of the Non-
Aligned Movement, representing 115 member states, issued a special declaration 
welcoming the Advisory Opinion and the UNGA resolution. Among other measures, the 
Non-Aligned Movement ministers called for specific action from member states in 
response to the Israeli rejection of the ICJ ruling. These actions included the prevention 
of “any products of illegal Israeli settlements from entering their markets, to decline entry 
to Israeli settlers, and to impose sanctions against companies and entities involved in the 
construction of the wall and other illegal activities” in the occupied territories.169
 
  
The United States harshly criticized the Advisory Opinion, and subsequently voted 
against the UNGA resolution. The American ambassador to the UN, John Danforth, 
explained that the US opposed the UNGA reference to the ICJ because it “points away 
from a political solution” to the Middle East conflict. He went on to state that the US 
voted against the UNGA resolution accepting the Advisory Opinion because it “…is not 
balanced. It is wholly one-sided. It does not mention the threat terrorists pose to Israel. It 
follows a long line of one-sided resolutions adopted by the General Assembly.”170
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168 U.N.G.A. Res. A/Res/ES-10/15. The six states voting against the resolution were: Australia, Micronesia, 
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week before the UNGA vote, the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed 
(361-45) a bi-partisan resolution deploring the “misuse of the International Court of 
Justice” by the United Nations General Assembly “for the narrow political purpose of 
advancing the Palestinian position.” The House of Representatives’ resolution also 
cautioned “members of the international community that they risk a strongly negative 
impact on their relationship” with the United States “should they use the ICJ’s advisory 
judgment as an excuse to interfere on the Roadmap process.”171 Both President Bush and 
the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee, John Kerry, condemned the ICJ 
judgement shortly after its release, with Kerry stating that: “Israel’s fence is a legitimate 




In Israel, the response among the leading political, military and media circles to the ICJ 
proceedings was aptly summarized by Ha’aretz writer Amira Hass as: “Hague, 
shmague”.173 The Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, Dan Gillerman, stated that 
his country was “especially disappointed by the exploitation of the [ICJ] in this case,” 
and criticized the Advisory Opinion for not seriously addressing the issue of terrorism.174 
According to Ra’anan Gissin, a senior advisor to Prime Minister Sharon, the Advisory 
Opinion belonged in “the trash-bin of history”, and the Beit Sourik ruling by the Israeli 
Supreme Court was the only legal judgement that Israel would obey. “The building of the 
fence will go on,” he said, immediately after the UNGA vote. “Israel will not stop 
building it or abdicate its inalienable right to self-defence.”175
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the Israeli Foreign Ministry accused the European Union “of encouraging Palestinian 
terrorism” by supporting the UNGA resolution. “The willingness of the EU to fall in with 
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price of descending to the lowest common denominator, raises doubt as to the ability of 
the EU to contribute anything constructive to the diplomatic process.”176
 
 
However, within some Israeli decision-making circles, the ICJ judgement ignited a 
serious debate during the summer of 2004 about the applicability of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and the potential danger of international sanctions if the Advisory Opinion 
was ignored. Justice Minister Yosef Lapid warned in mid-July that Israel could become 
an international pariah, and urged the Israeli government not to ignore the ICJ ruling. “If 
we don’t respect human rights in the territories, we’ll be putting ourselves in the situation 
in which South Africa found itself.”177 The Israeli Attorney-General, Menachem Mazuz, 
stated the following month in a legal opinion to the Prime Minister that: “It is difficult to 
exaggerate the negative ramifications of the ICJ’s opinion.” He recommended that Israel 
fully apply the Fourth Geneva Convention to the occupied territories, and pointed out 
how an international campaign of boycotts against South Africa gained momentum after 
the International Court had ruled that its occupation of Namibia was illegal.178 However, 
these cautions were resisted by others in the senior Israeli political and military 
leadership. The Legal Advisor to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Alan Baker, publicly 
criticized Mazuz, saying that “This is why there is a Foreign Ministry…It doesn’t need 
this type of team of academics to tell it what to do.”179 The Ministry of Defence also 
responded to the internal critics with its stated commitment that the Wall would not be 
moved to the 1967 Green Line.180
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 It did, however, began to plan some alternatives routes 
for the Wall in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, consistent with its reading of the Beit 
Sourik ruling. In early September 2004, Ariel Sharon announced that, once the new route 
of the Wall had been accepted by himself and the Defence Minister, Shaul Mofaz, the 
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plan would be first taken to Washington for approval by National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice, before being presented to the Israeli cabinet.181
 
 
During the autumn of 2004 and the early winter of 2005, the United Nations maintained 
its focus on the deleterious effects of the Wall on the Palestinians in the West Bank. In 
October 2004, John Dugard, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in the occupied 
territories, stated bluntly that the Wall’s purpose went well beyond security. “It appears 
to be designed to seize land for the present settlers and future settlers – that is, for the 
State of Israel. It also appears to be designed to cause an exodus of Palestinians from the 
areas adjacent to the Wall.”182 By way of contrast, in late November, Kofi Annan, the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, described the events of the prior year 
concerning the Wall in a strangely flat tone, observing simply that: “Israel was continuing 
construction of the barrier in parts of the West Bank during the year,” before listing the 
various events surrounding the ICJ ruling, without any further comment.183 In early 
January 2005, following up on the request of the General Assembly, the Secretary-
General’s office announced that it would seek to establish a Registry of Damage, which 
would gather claims regarding material damages suffered by Palestinians by the 
construction of the Wall.184 In March 2005, the United Nations issued a comprehensive 
and grim portrait of the humanitarian consequences of the Wall.185
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extensive examples of the economic hardship faced by the West Bank inhabitants from 
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being restricted from, or unable to, reach their agricultural lands, or being cut off from 
schools, health care and social services.  It observed that: “The damage caused by the 
destruction of land and property for the Barrier’s construction will take many years to 
recover and hinder Palestinian development should a political situation allow this.”186
 
  
On 20 February 2005, eight months after the Beit Sourik ruling, the Israeli cabinet 
approved the revised route of the Wall. According to the United Nations,187 the total 
length of the new route approved by the cabinet would be increased to 670 kilometres, 
compared to 622 kilometres for the original route, and would now cost an estimated $3.4 
billion (US). The Wall’s new route, 80% of which will be located within the West Bank, 
would encompass approximately 10% of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, 2.5% less 
land area than the previous path, primarily because of changes to the planned route in the 
South Hebron area.188 More than 80% of the settler population in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem would now be on the ‘Israeli’ side of the Wall. The new route would make two 
large incursions into the West Bank, in order to encompass the Israeli settlements of Ariel 
and Ma’aleh Adumim.189 At the cabinet meeting, the Israeli ministers understood that the 
Beit Sourik and Advisory Opinion judgements had narrowed their options, and time was 
now of the essence: “ ‘What it was possible to do two years ago cannot be done 
anymore,’ said Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz to his colleague Benjamin Netanyahu. 
‘And what it is possible to do now, you won’t be able to do in another two years. Which 
is why we have to finish it now.’ ”190
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 The cabinet ministers also understood that they 
were deciding not only the route of the Wall, but also the new frontiers of Israel. 
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meeting: “The cabinet decision states that the fence is a ‘temporary means of securing 
against terror attacks,’ but despite the cautious wording, those present at the meeting had 
no doubt that they were drawing the borders of the future.”191
 
 
Shortly after the cabinet decision, the Israeli State Attorney’s Office filed a 180 page 
response to the ICJ ruling with the Israeli Supreme Court. This response had been 
requested by the Court in late August 2004, while they were hearing further petitions 
from Palestinian villagers affected by the Wall who were now basing some of their 
arguments on the Advisory Opinion.192 The State Attorney’s Office argued that the ICJ 
judgement was, for two reasons, no longer relevant to any court challenges to the Wall in 
Israel. First, it maintained, the facts relied upon by the ICJ were unbalanced and now 
outdated, the International Court’s decision underplayed both the threat of terrorism to 
Israel and the importance of military necessity, and it failed to appreciate the 
considerations that shaped the routing of each particular section of the Wall. Second, the 
Office argued that the Beit Sourik ruling had improved the ‘fabric of life’ for the 
Palestinians living near the Wall by increasing access to their lands. As well, the route 
changes triggered by the Israeli Supreme Court decision, and approved by the Israeli 
cabinet, have created a ‘materially different’ path for the Wall than what had been 
considered by the International Court of Justice. In its conclusion, the State Attorney’s 
Office said to the Supreme Court that: “the factual background before the [ICJ] when it 
wrote the Advisory Opinion was lacking, inexact and now irrelevant in a manner that 
precludes its conclusions that the entire route of the fence within the West Bank was in 
violation of international law from having any application upon the cases before the High 
Court of Justice.”193 As subsequent legal critiques by NGOs have pointed out,194
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Office’s response was fatuous, since the vast majority of the Wall will remain in the 
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occupied territories, a reality unaltered by the Beit Sourik decision. The fact that nowhere 
in the State Attorney Office’s lengthy response was there any direct discussion of the 
Advisory Opinion’s principal finding – that a security barrier built on occupied territory 
to protect illegal civilian settlements and to consolidate unlawful military gains is itself 
illegal – can be seen as an implicit acknowledgement that the heart of the ICJ ruling is 
unanswerable. 
 
During the spring and early summer months of 2005, the primary focus of the Wall’s 
construction and its legal challenges was centred around East Jerusalem. In early July, 
Prime Minister Sharon criticized the IDF for “taking too long” in completing the 
Jerusalem section of the Wall: “You have no budgetary problems, and you must improve 
the pace [of construction].”195 According to Ha’aretz, more than 70% of the 130 
kilometres of the Wall along the IDF’s proposed route around East Jerusalem would be 
within the territory of the West Bank, up to a depth of 10 kilometres. Only four 
kilometres would be placed within the post-1967 illegally annexed municipal area of 
Jerusalem, with another 12 kilometres running near its present border.196 If the Israeli 
Supreme Court endorses this planned route by dismissing petitions from Palestinians 
challenging the Wall’s path, and if there is no judicial objection to extending the Wall to 
include the settlement of Ma’aleh Adumim, then the total area of Jerusalem would 
expand by 165 square kilometres.197 This would more than double the existing size of 
Jerusalem, with the vast majority of the municipality located on occupied territory. In 
early July, the Israeli cabinet decided to place a number of Palestinian neighbourhoods in 
and around Jerusalem, where most of the 55,000 inhabitants possess legal status as 
Jerusalemites, on the West Bank side of the Wall.198 Even though these Jerusalemites 
would remain in their houses, the Wall will remove them from their city, creating 
additional hardships for an already disadvantaged population.199
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 As Israeli political 
historian Tom Segev observed, after touring the Wall’s route around East Jerusalem: 
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“what is happening today in Jerusalem goes beyond security needs and reflects the 
essence of the original Zionist dream: maximum territory, minimum Arabs.”200
 
  
During the hearings by the Israeli Supreme Court in the late spring and early summer of 
2005 respecting petitions against the Wall around Jerusalem, the Israeli State Attorney’s 
Office acknowledged, for the first time before an Israeli court, that part of Israel’s 
motivation to build the Wall was indeed political. The Israeli government lawyer stated to 
the Court that, when building the Wall within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem 
(which he argued was a sovereign part of Israel), the route of the fence can legitimately 
have political, and not just security, implications.201 This appears to be a coded legal 
reference to placing as many Palestinian, including Palestinian Jerusalemites, outside of 
the Wall as possible.202 During the course of the hearings, the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, indicated that he accepted this argument. Despite the 
clear statements of international law,203 Chief Justice Barak also said that Jerusalem is the 
capital of Israel, East Jerusalem is Israel’s territory and Israel is sovereign to act there 
regardless of international law. He continued: “The reference to East Jerusalem as 
conquered territory does not apply from our perspective.”204
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 In the Court’s eyes, political 
motivations for the Wall in the West Bank would be illegitimate, but political 
considerations for the Wall in and around Jerusalem would create no judicial 
implications, because no part of the city is deemed by it to be occupied territory. Yet, 
even this dubious distinction did not last long. In early July 2005, an Israeli government 
lawyer opposing a number of petitions to change the route of the Wall in the northern 
West Bank around the settlement of Alfei Menashe acknowledged to the Court for the 
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first time that political considerations played a part in the Israeli government’s decision-
making regarding the path of the Wall through the West Bank as well. Belying the 
temporary nature of the Wall, the lawyer also argued before the Court that the Wall, as it 




On the first anniversary of the Advisory Opinion and the General Assembly resolution 
accepting the ICJ ruling, the international community maintained its supine reluctance to 
meaningfully oppose the Wall. At the end of June, the Swiss Ambassador to the United 
Nations, Peter Maurer, wrote to the President of the General Assembly to report on his 
consultations with the 189 state signatories of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the 
Wall, as requested by the July 2004 General Assembly resolution.206 Ambassador Maurer 
stated that there was a virtual consensus among the consulted states that holding a special 
conference under the Fourth Geneva Convention would be inadvisable at this time. 
Apparently reflecting the views of many of the consulted nations, Maurer’s letter did not 
even reiterate the General Assembly’s call for the Wall to be halted and demolished. 
Instead, he simply stressed the need for an improvement in the humanitarian and 
economic situation of the Palestinians, and to promote more dialogue between Israel and 
the Palestinian Authority. During a visit to the Middle East in early July, Javier Solana, 
the European Community’s High Representative for Foreign Policy, criticized the route 
of the Wall around Jerusalem, but did not threaten any action.207 Later in the month, the 
Security Council heard a debate from UN members regarding Israel’s ongoing 
construction of the Wall, but it ended the consultation without issuing a statement or 
calling for any deterrent measures against Israel.208
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Kidwa, criticized the “miserable failure” of the international community to take steps to 
enforce the remedies directed by the International Court of Justice.209 In early August, 
eight Special Rapporteurs with the United Nations Commission on Human Rights issued 
a joint international appeal, which stated that “the ICJ’s Opinion has been ignored in 
favour of negotiations conducted in terms of the Road Map process.” This sidelining of 
the Advisory Opinion was unacceptable, the Special Rapporteurs argued, because the 
Road Map permitted “the continued presence of some settlements, which were found by 
the ICJ to be unlawful, and by necessary implication the continued existence of some 
parts of the wall in Palestinian territory.”210
 
 
On 15 September 2005, the Israeli Supreme Court issued Mara’abe v. The Prime 
Minister of Israel, dealing with the route of the Wall around the settlement of Alfei 
Menashe.211 The Court’s unanimous decision was a direct echo of its earlier ruling in Beit 
Sourik. It rejected the arguments of the Palestinian petitioners that the construction of the 
Wall in occupied territory was illegal,212 that it was built for political reasons,213 or that it 
was anything but temporary.214 As well, it again refused to grapple with the illegality of 
the Israeli settlements in international law.215
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 Equally significantly, the Supreme Court 
accepted the Israeli government’s arguments as to why the Wall could not be built on the 
1949 Green Line: the topography of the 1949 armistice line, the close proximity of many 
modern Israeli towns and cities to the 1949 line, and the protection of the large number of 
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Israeli settlers living beyond the Green Line. However, as in Beit Sourik, the Supreme 
Court went on to find that the particular section of the Wall in the northern West Bank 
created a “chokehold” around the five Palestinian villages neighbouring Alfei Menashe, 
and therefore failed the Court’s constrained proportionality test.216
 
  
Equally significantly, the Supreme Court took this occasion to distance itself from the 
International Court of Justice’s ruling in Advisory Opinion. Adopting many of the 
arguments advanced by the Israeli State Attorney’s Office in its response to the ICJ 
ruling, the Supreme Court stated that the Advisory Opinion was deficient because the 
International Court lacked a comprehensive factual record before it to properly assess 
Israel’s difficult security-military needs.217 As well, according to the Supreme Court, the 
ICJ did not appreciate the necessity for proportionally assessing the different segments of 
the Wall; rather, the Court said that, by determining the Wall’s legality only looking at 
the entire route, the ICJ was unable to engage in a more particular analytical review of 
the barrier’s specific impact.218
…the ICJ’s conclusion, based upon a factual basis different from the one before us, is not 
res judicata, and does not obligate the Supreme Court of Israel to rule that each and every 
segment of the fence violates international law.
 Without grappling with many of the substantive legal 
findings of law in the Advisory Opinion, the Supreme Court found that the ICJ’s ruling 




The ISC ruling in Mara’abe was issued on the same day that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
spoke before the United Nations General Assembly. Following the Israeli withdrawal 
from Gaza, Sharon was greeted at the UN as a statesman, and Israel was enjoying its 
highest international standing since the start of the Oslo process. Any concerns among the 
Israeli political and military leadership that its continued construction of the Wall would 
result in serious political costs had entirely dissipated. Indeed, by the late autumn, some 
senior Israeli political leaders were confident enough to speak more frankly about the 
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ultimate consequences of the Wall. Addressing an Israeli legal conference in late 
November, the Minister of Justice, Tzipi Livni, stated that the Wall will serve as “the 
future border of the state of Israel” and that “the High Court of Justice, in its rulings over 
the fence, is drawing the country’s borders.”220 In response, the Vice-President of the 
Israeli Supreme Court, Mishael Cheshin, remarked that: “This is not what you have 
contended in court”, noting that the state prosecution lawyers, whom Livni supervises as 




V Conclusion   
“[A state] which consistently sets itself above the solemnly and repeatedly 
expressed judgment of the [United Nations] Organization, in particular in 
proportion as that judgment approximates to unanimity, may find that it has 
overstepped the imperceptible line between impropriety and illegality, between 
discretion and arbitrariness, between the exercise of the legal right to disregard 
the recommendation and the abuse of that right, and that it has exposed itself to 
consequences legitimately following as a legal sanction.” 
 
        Judge Hersch Lauterpacht, The International Court of Justice, 1955 222
 
 
The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Separation Wall has 
illustrated both the significance and the necessity of a rights-based approach as an 
integral part of any political process to reach a comprehensive, just and durable 
settlement of the Israel/Palestine conflict. On many of the core issues of the conflict, the 
most important international court in the world delivered clear and purposive findings. 
The right of the Palestinians to self-determination was recognized. The West Bank, Gaza 
and East Jerusalem were designated as occupied territories under international law. 
Israel’s obligations as an occupying power, and the rights of the Palestinians as an 
occupied people, were spelled out. As well, the International Court of Justice ruled that 
Israel’s settlements were illegal; its land confiscation and house demolition regime was 
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unlawful; and the international community bore a special responsibility to enforce the 
humanitarian law obligations violated by the conduct of the occupying power. And, on 
the central issue before the Court, Israel’s Separation Wall was found to be in 
fundamental breach of international humanitarian and human rights law. The weakness of 
the Advisory Opinion – its lack of fully developed legal explanations for several of its 
justifiable findings – pales in comparison to the persuasiveness of much of its reasoning, 
the strength of its conclusions, and the breadth of its remedial proposals. In a seemingly 
intractable conflict fraught with competing political and historical narratives that confuse 
most casual observers, the lucidity of the law, particularly as expressed in the ICJ 
opinion, can sweep away much of the obfuscation and make the solutions appear both 
understandable and obtainable.  
 
Much less can be said about the Beit Sourik ruling of the Israeli Supreme Court. Working 
with many of the same legal instruments as the International Court of Justice, the 
Supreme Court produced a limp and submissive judgement that misapplied or ignored a 
number of the applicable legal principles on occupation and humanitarian requirements. 
While Beit Sourik curbed aspects of the very worst excesses of the Wall, it also endorsed 
a barrier that entrenches the occupation, solidifies the Israeli settlement project, 
intensifies the economic and social crises of the occupied population, and advances the 
demographic division of the land and its spoils for the benefit of the occupier. 
International law speaks clearly and critically on all these issues, but not through the 
garbled voice of the Israeli Supreme Court. Many liberal supporters of Israel hailed Beit 
Sourik as an important example of the judicial independence and openness of the 
Supreme Court, but more reflective observers have pointed out that the judgement is 
actually quite consistent with the abject historical unwillingness of the Court to 
meaningfully confront the Israeli occupation with the sharp and available tools of the law. 
Indeed, as an articulation of the dual nature of law, Beit Sourik illustrates the flip side of 
the coin from the Advisory Opinion: the shaping and application of legal principles to 
secure privilege, rather than to curb power.     
 
More than ever, a rights-based approach is required to unlock the barricaded door to 
Middle East peace. Such an approach requires the parties to a conflict to resolve their 
differences, and to build their new relationship, through the cornerstone principles of 
national, human and individual rights which have emerged since the Second World War. 
These rights are found in the United Nations Charter and in UN resolutions, in 
international treaties and conventions, and in the affirmative practice of modern states. A 
rights-based approach – which emphasizes equality, dignity, social and political rights, 
reconciliation, and human security – has become an integral part of the successful 
settlement of recent conflicts throughout the world. Indeed, applying this approach to the 
Israel/Palestine conflict would finally create something close to a level playing field at 
the negotiating table between two quite asymmetrical parties, and thus offer a real chance 
for peace. It is uncontestable that the status quo approach to Middle-East peace-making 
has failed bitterly. Unequal power politics have guided all peace-making efforts to 
resolve the conflict in the modern era, producing peace proposals and political 
agreements that have not only been lopsided, but have been unworkable precisely 
because they are so lopsided.  
 
Yet, it cannot be forgotten that international public law commands authority almost 
entirely through moral suasion, for it has no courts or police to enforce its strictures. 
Without the political will of states to compel serial or abusive violators to comply with 
their humanitarian and human rights obligations, it is only through the social mobilization 
of civil society that the aspirations of justice and equality embedded in the covenants of 
international public law may be realized. More than a year after the Advisory Opinion 
was issued, the political will of the United Nations and its members to enforce the ICJ 
ruling has been distressingly somnolent. This has left virtually the entire task of keeping 
the Advisory Opinion on the world’s agenda to the domain of civil society and its nascent 
organs: non-governmental organizations, intellectuals, critical journalism, human rights 
activism, and the popular conscience. To date, alas, they have had only sparse influence. 
Yet, it has become painfully clear that nothing short of comprehensive deterrent actions 
by the United Nations and its members – such as the threat or application of diplomatic 
isolation and economic sanctions – will compel Israel to take its legal obligations 
seriously. Indeed, the struggle between Israel and Palestine may be now approaching that 
dangerous hour between a chronically unstable yet managed conflict and a wider, more 
uncontrollable and more savage maelstrom, exacerbated by the unilateral imposition by 
Israel of a grossly inequitable separation of the land and populations via the Wall. Should 
the promise of the Advisory Opinion go unfulfilled, and it loses its way down the same 
diplomatic memory hole inhabited by the countless UN resolutions on the conflict, then 
the international community may well ponder in future years about how it lost one of its 
very best last chances to affirmatively shape a conclusive and satisfying peace for all of 
those Palestinians and Israelis who live under the shadow of the sword. 
 
 
 
